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
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A PRIMER OF THE WAR FOR AMERICANS

WRITTEN AND COMPILED BY

AN AMERICAN

J. WILLIAM WHITE

PHILADELPHIA
THE JOHN C. WINSTON COMPANY
PUBLISHERS

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PREFACE

Very soon after the beginning of the war its literature was already so voluminous, the statements made by the warring nations were so contradictory, the accusations and counter-accusations were so numerous, the pleas of impassioned advocates were so irreconcilable, that a certain bewilderment and confusion on the part of Americans was almost inevitable.

It is greatly to the credit of the intelligence and clear thinking of the nation that from the day England's "White Book" was laid before the world this country as a whole—with the exception of those Germans living here, who are known as "German-Americans"—ranged itself spontaneously and with practical unanimity on the side of the Allies. But however correct this position was—and I believe it was absolutely correct—it soon became apparent that not everyone who occupied it could give cogent and convincing reasons for the belief that was in him, or could refute clearly and logically the opposing arguments and correct the misstatements on which they were often based.

As I found this to be my own case I began to set aside, or to note down, as if I were preparing for a lecture, the questions which seemed to me of fundamental importance and the answers that most impressed and satisfied me. Later, for the attempted benefit of my family and of a few friends, and for the further clari-

fication of my own views, I threw these memoranda into the form of a series of questions and answers. In doing this I had then no definite idea of any wider use of this material and in now acceding to the suggestion of some friends that the matter thus brought together be given wider distribution I should very much like it to be understood that I do not feel that I have any special fitness for the self-imposed task. If I lay the result before readers—if I have any—outside the small circle for whom it was originally intended, it is only to try to do just for this moment the little that lies in me to help a cause in which I profoundly believe.

If the paper has any value it will not be from what I have written, but from the collocation of the opinions of others, each of whom is a recognized authority as to the subject he deals with.

Wherever my answers have involved questions of fact I have taken pains to attain accuracy. When they have related to matters of opinion I have endeavored to give the basis for such opinions. I adopted the Socratic method in the beginning because for me, without special training, it was the easiest. I have retained it for the same reason.

I beg to add finally that any proceeds that may accrue from the sale of this pamphlet are pledged in advance to the Belgian Relief Fund.

J. William White.

1810 S. Rittenhouse Square,
Philadelphia.

I

What evidence exists as to the real reason, the fundamental cause of this war?

A. *a.* The most conclusive evidence is to be found in the writings and teachings of prominent and representative Germans during the past forty-three years, *i. e.,* ever since the victory of Germany over France.

These writings and teachings demonstrate the determination of Germany to attain "World Power." This determination was the fundamental cause of the war. The writings in question are fairly illustrated by excerpts given below. It should be premised that as soon as these doctrines became widely known to the world outside of Germany and exerted their inevitable influence upon public opinion, apologists and repudiators sprang up among the Germans, or the "German-Americans." For example, to take only a few of the latter: Herr Ridder, of the *Staats Zeitung,* says (1) in reference to certain English writers:

> "I am unable to come to any other conclusion than that their readings have been confined to Bernhardi and Treitschke, those two German writers who were never a part of German intellectual life and were both disowned by the German people.
>
> "As a matter of fact, Bernhardi is not even read in Germany. Of his works, published by Cotta, only 8,000 copies have been given to the public to date.

> "The writings of Treitschke, as a historian, are regarded by Germans as brilliant, but Treitschke is remembered by them as a man of intense party feeling who labored under the spirit of 1870, and was incapable of true sympathy with their racial aspirations."

No evidence that I have been able to find serves to justify these statements.

Another German-American, Mr. Rinald, calls Bernhardi "a retired German General of jingoistic tendencies," and asks for "proof" that his book had the approval of the Kaiser. It would seem sufficient reply to him to ask for proof that it had his disapproval. In the absence of such proof it is fair to assume, in view of the Kaiser's incessant activities and restless supervision of all things German, and especially of all things military, that at least the book did not greatly displease him. Still another, Professor Jastrow, also repudiates Bernhardi as an exponent of German thought, but gives no more convincing reasons.

The following quotation from a letter of Dr. Jastrow to *The Nation* (November 12, 1914) well illustrates the tactics I am considering. After asserting that at first "we" (he professes to be speaking for Americans) threw the sole responsibility of the war upon the Kaiser, he continues:

> "When doubt arose as to the accuracy of this picture of a modern combination of Machiavelli and Napoleon, we discovered Bernhardi, and found that his influence, or that of the whole party which he

> represents, was behind it all. Bernhardi frequently quoted a man by the name of Treitschke, and, although very few in this country had ever heard of him and scarcely anybody had read him (for his works had not been translated into English), we were willing to take him on faith, and were quite satisfied that his teachings involved the conquest of all of western Europe and of England for the purpose of spreading German 'culture'; and to this programme we added, of our own accord, the subsequent conquest of the United States."

He must, like Münsterberg (page 78), be writing to impress a peculiarly infantile type of American mind. The effort to belittle, for this purpose, the great Pan-German historian, by speaking of him as "a man named Treitschke," is particularly characteristic.

But his whole argument to the effect that because we "have just discovered" these people, therefore we are wrong in believing that they represent Germany, is scarcely worthy of notice.

What does it matter that Americans generally were not familiar with their writings until this shocking war was begun.

Of what importance is it that we were in ignorance of their grandiose plans and sinister purposes?

What bearing on the real question has the fact that Treitschke had not been translated into English when we first began to take an interest in him? None whatever. It is not worth while to try to drag that herring across the trail.

The question remains: What *were* their teachings and what reason is there to believe that they greatly influenced German public opinion?

As to Dr. Jastrow's final sentence that "*we* added of *our* own accord the subsequent conquest of the United States," I beg to refer the reader—with at present merely incidental mention of the offensive "we" and "our"—to pages 110-13.

We are asked to believe that a former member of the German army staff, who, so far as we know, has never been reproved or censured or contradicted by the Kaiser, or by any other member of that staff, who wrote as an expert in both German statesmanship and German strategy, and whose book, published three years ago, forecast with entire accuracy the actions and movements of Germany in the present war, was "disowned by the German people" and did not represent the military caste to which he belonged.

It is not possible to believe this or to think that he was not in full touch with the scarcely concealed purposes of the "Weltmacht oder Niedergang" party. His book was an amazingly frank exposition of those purposes and an extravagant and unqualified eulogy of militarism.

Before the war his uncontradicted statements were generally accepted as embodying the views of the autocratic caste, and in the present campaign both the German armies and the German diplomats have, even down to relatively unimportant details, followed with curious exactness his prophetic tactics.

As to Treitschke, whom many of the German-American commentators similarly repudiate, he was unquestionably one of their great national historians. Mr. Bryce calls him "the famous Professor of History." His lectures at Berlin were listened to for years by crowded and enthusiastic audiences, his teachings as to *Politik* became a gospel. Mr. Norman Hapgood (2) says of him:

> "He, most of all, made intellectual Germany drunk with the idea of her so-called destiny. He taught her that all history led up to the leadership of the Teuton. . . . Germans quote him as no historian is quoted by the English or the French. In interpreting history he is their Bible. Their political thinkers never tire of him."

On the other hand, I have failed to find in the writings of the German apologists any evidence of ante-bellum repudiation of these writers, and in the absence of such evidence, and in the light of the collateral proof furnished by the writings of others (also quoted below), and by the outbreak and conduct of the war, they must be considered as representing the views of at least that part of the German people who were intelligent enough to understand them. The quotations follow. I have used some of those employed by Viscount Bryce in a recent article (3), and have added to them from a list of my own almost as striking and conclusive:

"War is in itself a good thing. It is a biological necessity of the first importance."

"The inevitableness, the idealism, the blessing of war as an indispensable and stimulating law of development must be repeatedly emphasized."

"War is the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power. Efforts to secure peace are extraordinarily detrimental as soon as they can influence politics."

"Efforts directed toward the abolition of war are not only foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized as unworthy of the human race."

"Courts of arbitration are pernicious delusions. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachment on natural laws of development, which can only lead to more disastrous consequences for humanity generally."

"The maintenance of peace never can be or may be the goal of a policy."

"Efforts for peace would, if they attained their goal, lead to general degeneration, as happens everywhere in nature where the struggle for existence is eliminated."

"Huge armaments are in themselves desirable. They are the most necessary precondition of our national health."

"The end all and be all of a State is power, and he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle with politics." (Quoted from Treitschke's "Politik.")

"The State's highest moral duty is to increase its power."

"The State is justified in making conquests whenever its own advantage seems to require additional territory."

"Self-preservation is the State's highest ideal and justifies whatever action it may take if that action be conducive to that end. The State is the sole judge of the morality of its action. It is, in fact, above morality, or, in other words, whatever is necessary is moral. Recognized rights (*i.e.*, treaty rights) are never absolute rights; they are of human origin and, therefore, imperfect and variable. There are conditions in which they do not correspond to the actual truth of things. In this case infringement of the right appears morally justified."

"In fact, the State is a law unto itself. Weak nations have not the same right to live as powerful and vigorous nations."

"Any nation in favor of collective humanity outside the limits of the State and nationality is impossible."

"War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilization."

"Just as increase of population forms under certain circumstances a convincing argument for war, so industrial conditions may compel the same result."

"Frederick the Great recognized the ennobling effect of war. 'War,' he said, 'opens the most fruitful field to all virtues, for at every moment constancy, pity, magnanimity, heroism and mercy shine forth in it; every moment offers an opportunity to exercise one of these virtues.'"

"We can, fortunately, assert the impossibility of efforts after peace ever attaining their ultimate object in a world bristling with arms, where a healthy ego-

ism still directs the policy of most countries. 'God will see to it,' says Treitschke, 'that war always recurs as a drastic medicine for the human race.'"

"We ought to know that there is no such thing as eternal peace; we ought to have always in our minds that saying of Moltke's: 'perpetual peace is a dream and not even a beautiful dream. But war is a link in the divine system of the universe.'" (4)

"The German nation has been called the nation of poets and thinkers, and it may be proud of the name. To-day it may again be called the *nation of masterful combatants,* as which it originally appeared in history." (5)

These quotations could be largely added to, but as their authors are generals, philosophers, theologians, and princes, they seem representative enough to show the spirit that, whatever may have been its numerical or geographical extent, actuated and inspired that portion of the German people who had the power last midsummer to commit the entire nation to a gigantic war, with "Deutschland über Alles" and "Weltmacht oder Niedergang" as its battle cries.

Every student of Nature recognizes and deplores the cruelty inseparable from the struggle for existence underlying the great biological law of the survival of the fittest.

But it has remained for these spokesmen of Germany to apply it to civilized nations without essential change or modification, eliminating all considerations of morality, of altruism, of kindliness to the weak or helpless, of everything, in fact, which serves to distin-

guish us from our fellow animals. There is little enough at the best, but Bernhardi's "biological necessity" of war, like the "necessity"—to overrun Belgium —of the German Chancellor, is simply a barefaced return to the ethics of the tiger or, in its coldbloodedness, of the crocodile.

It was amusing, though irritating, to find an American (Professor Jastrow), (6) in face of the above evidence and much more that is similar, crying to the American people:

> "Let us be fair and recognize that the spirit of militarism is strong in all of the warring nations,"

and then going on, with the tendency that most of our "German-American" disputants have clumsily shown, to belittle while attempting to conciliate the country of their adoption, to say:

> "Even we are not entirely free of it, for does not Theodore Roosevelt voice a widely prevailing sentiment when he advocates warfare as essential to the full strength of the nation?"

The answer to which is, of course, that Colonel Roosevelt never "voiced" or otherwise favored any such sentiment, and that no sensible person ever believed it to be widely prevalent in this country.

The distinction between the advocacy of sufficient armaments to ensure respectful treatment from military or naval bullies and the advocacy of "warfare" is

so patent that the misstatement implies a confusion of thought that should much lessen the value—if it had any—of the author's labored but superficial impartiality. The real animus invariably crops out in all these "German-American" writers and, in the present case the "appeal for fairness and moderation" contains the statement that it was a "privilege"

> "To see a great united people rising to fight, not for aggrandizement, for ports on the Atlantic Ocean, or for colonies, or eager for conquest of any kind, but struggling solely for their existence to preserve the fruits of their labors of the last thirty years."

The "appeal" also describes the readiness of "Germany" "to promise the integrity of France *and even of the French Colonies* if England would remain neutral." (The italics are mine.) It does not mention the fact that this suggestion was made by Prince Lichnowski (the German Ambassador in London) on his individual initiative and without authority from his government; or that on July 29th the German Chancellor, when asked about the French colonies, had declined to commit himself (English White Book, No. 85); or that at about that time Germany had failed to say that it was "prepared to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other power violates it," although France had given an unequivocal promise to that effect. Nor does it allude to the English reason for refusal to accept the informal sugges-

tion, namely, "that France without losing territory might be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power and become subordinate to German policy."

This is a digression, but it will serve as an example of the "fairness and moderation" of the Münsterbergs and Franckes, the Ridders and Jagemanns and the Hilprechts and Jastrows.

b. But Question 1 is not yet fully answered. *Can any collateral evidence of the determination to attain to "World Power" be found in the estimation in which Germans hold their country and themselves?*

I think it can.

A little book with the crude title of "Germany's Swelled Head," written by Emil Reich, a Hungarian, I believe, and published in London in 1907, contains much interesting, sometimes amusing, information on this subject.

The writer quotes various authors in support of the statement that when the Kaiser speaks or writes of Greater Germany he "in all sincerity means two-thirds of Europe. He means that the German Empire of the near future will, and by right of Race ought to, comprise two-thirds of Europe." He adds that this idea may appear too childish for serious consideration, says that in all countries there have been single eccentrics who have absurdly overrated the significance and importance of their nation, and that such persons do not prove very much as to the state of mind of the majority of a people. But he insists that

> "That which, in other countries never rises beyond a mere oddity is, in contemporary Germany, a vast wave of national thought. In the Fatherland, as has long been remarked by many an observing traveler or scholar, the writers, teachers, journalists and scholars of the day have an infinitely greater influence on the people, than similar brain-workers ever wield in England."

He then quotes from "The Foundations of the XIXth Century," a book which he says was warmly and publicly approved by the Kaiser, and which sold largely in Germany and gave rise to a mass of controversial literature. The author, Chamberlain by name, says:

> "By Germans, I mean the various populations of Northern Europe who appear in history as Kelts, Germans, Slavs, and from whom, mostly in inextricable confusion, the peoples of modern Europe are sprung. That they came originally from a single family is certain, but the German, in the narrower Tacitean sense, has kept himself so pre-eminent among his kinsmen intellectually, morally and physically, that we are justified in applying his name to the whole family. The German is the soul of our culture. The Europe of to-day, spread far over the globe, exhibits the brilliant result of an infinitely varied ramification. What binds us into one is the Germanic blood. . . . Only Germans sit on European thrones. What has happened is only *prolegomena*. . . . True history begins from the moment when the German, with mighty hand, seizes the inheritance of antiquity."

Reich quotes further from the work of Ludwig Woltmann, *"Die Germanen und die Renaissance in Italien"* (1905), in which the effort is made to prove that Benvenuto Cellini, Michaelangelo, Lorenzo Ghiberti, Giovanni Bellini, Leonardo da Vinci and Raffael, were all of German birth or ancestry. He admits that this may be merely misplaced erudition, or "stuff and twaddle." His point is that it is characteristic, that it is taken seriously in Germany, and that it was gravely noticed in some of the oldest and most respectable German reviews. He quotes again the author of the "Foundations of the XIXth Century," who says, apropos of the overrunning of the Holy Roman Empire by the Germans:

> "We can regret only one thing—that the German did not, everywhere his conquering arm preyed, exterminate more completely," and that consequently the Latins "gradually recovered wide territories from the only quickening influence of pure blood and unbroken youth, in fact, from the control of the highest talent." Elsewhere the same writer laments that Italy "is lost, irredeemably lost, because it lacks the inner driving power, the greatness of soul which would fit its talent. This power comes from Race alone. Italy had it as long as it possessed Germans."

Reich says that Friedrich Lange, erstwhile editor of the *Tägliche Rundschau,* has gone so far as to invent and preach a species of "German religion" (*Deutsche Religion*), and from many pulpits it has

been announced that "the German people is the elect of God, and its enemies are the enemies of the Lord."

He quotes from the "Vorwärts" an extract from an oration by the theologian, Lezius:

> "Solomon has said: 'Do not be too good; do not be too just.' The Polish press should be simply annihilated. All Polish societies should be suppressed, without the slightest apology being made for such a measure. This summary procedure should be likewise applied to the French and Danish press, as well as to the societies of Alsace, Lorraine and Schleswig-Holstein. Especially should no consideration whatever be shown to anything relating to the Poles. The Constitution should be altered with regard to the latter. The Poles should be looked upon as helots. They should be allowed but three privileges: to pay taxes, serve in the army, and shut their jaws" (*sic*).

He (Reich) supports his views by the statement of the Russian novelist, Dostoiewski, who writes:

> "Chauvinism, pride, and an unlimited confidence in their own strength have intoxicated the Germans since the war (1870). This people, that has so rarely been a conqueror and has so often been conquered, had all of a sudden beaten the nation that had humiliated all the other nations. . . . On the other hand, the fact that Germany, but yesterday all parcelled out, has been able in so short a time to develop so strong a political organization, might well lead the Germans to believe that they are about to enter on a new phase of brilliant development. This conviction

has resulted in making the German not only Chauvinistic and conceited, but flightly as well; it is not only the Teutonic grocer and shoemaker now who are over-confident, but professors, eminent scientists, and even the ministers themselves as well."

"No wonder that the arrogance of the 'Elect Ones of God' comes out at every possible and impossible occasion. When Bismarck was asked what he would do, should some one hundred thousand British soldiers be landed on the north coast of Germany in case of a war with Great Britain, France and Germany, he replied: 'I should have them arrested by the police.'"

He continues:

"Can one wonder, under such circumstances, that the Kaiser a few years ago, at the celebration of the two hundredth anniversary of the foundation of the Kingdom of Prussia, exclaimed: 'Nothing must be settled in this world without the intervention of Germany and of the German Emperor.'"

He might have added the following:

"Only one is master of this country. That is I. Who opposes me I shall crush to pieces. . . . *Sic volo, sic jubeo.* . . . We Hohenzollerns take our crown from God alone, and to God alone we are responsible in the fulfilment of our duty. . . . *Suprema lex regis voluntas.*"—J. Ellis Barker, an English writer, born and educated in Germany. (The *Nineteenth Century*, September, 1914.) (7)

He might also have quoted Professor Rudolf Eucken of the University of Jena, a leader of German ethical thought:

> *"To us more than any other nation is intrusted the true structure of human existence;* as an intellectual people we have, irrespective of creeds, worked for soul depth in religion, for scientific thoroughness. . . . All this constitutes possessions of which mankind cannot be deprived; *possessions, the loss of which would make life and effort purposeless to mankind."* (8)

The Berlin *Deutsche Tageszeitung* urges the necessity of forcing the German language on the whole world.

> "It is a crying necessity," the Berlin paper says, "that German should replace English as the world language. Should the English language be victorious and become the world language the culture of mankind will stand before a closed door and the death knell will sound for civilization."

After talking of the "moral decay" of Great Britain and the "fearful brutalizing influences and complete animalization of the human species" in "every land where the English language is spoken" the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* continues:

> "Here we have the reason why it is necessary for the German, and with him the German language, to conquer. And the victory once won, be it now or be

it one hundred years hence, there remains a task for the German than which none is more important, that of forcing the German tongue on the world. On all men, not those belonging to the more cultured races only, but on men of all colors and nationalities, the German language acts as a blessing which, coming direct from the hand of God, sinks into the heart like a precious balm and ennobles it.

"English, the bastard tongue of the canting island pirates, must be swept from the place it has usurped and forced back into the remotest corners of Britain until it has returned to its original elements of an insignificant pirate dialect."

Major-General von Disfurth (retired), in an article contributed to the *Hamburg Nachrichten*, writes as follows:

"No object whatever can be served by taking any notice of the accusations of barbarity leveled against Germany by their foreign critics. We owe no explanations to any one. Whatever act committed by our troops for the purpose of discouraging, defeating and destroying the enemy is a brave act and fully justified. Germany stands the supreme arbiter of her own methods. It is no consequence whatever if all the monuments ever created, all the pictures ever painted, all the buildings ever erected by the great architects of the world be destroyed, if by their destruction we promoted Germany's victory. War is war. The ugliest stone placed to mark the burial of a German grenadier is a more glorious monument than all cathedrals Europe put together. They call us barbarians. What of it? We scorn them and their abuse.

> "For my part I hope that in this war we have merited the title, barbarians. Let neutral peoples and our enemies cease their empty chatter, which may well be compared to the twitter of birds. Let them cease to talk of the Cathedral of Rheims, and of all the churches and all the castles in France which have shared its fate. Our troops must achieve victory. What else matters?"

Professor Adolph Lasson, a German Privy Councillor and Professor of Philosophy in Berlin University, writes:

> "A man who is not a German knows nothing of Germany. We are morally and intellectually superior beyond all comparison as are our organizations and our institutions."

As to the facts bearing upon this preposterous overvaluation of German achievement, I shall have something to say later, but at present my object is to present a small portion of the evidence of the state of mind which, pervading all Germany, did so much to bring on the war.

Reich further quotes Treitschke as follows:

> "Then when the German flag flies over and protects this vast Empire, to whom will belong the sceptre of the universe? What nation will impose its wishes on the other enfeebled and decadent peoples? Will it not be Germany that will have the mission to ensure the peace of the world? Russia, that immense colossus still in process of formation, and with feet of clay,

> will be absorbed in its home and economic difficulties. England, stronger in appearance than in reality, will, without any doubt, see her colonies detach themselves from her and exhaust themselves in fruitless struggles. France, given over to internal dissensions and the strife of parties, will sink into hopeless decadence. As to Italy, she will have her work cut out to ensure a crust of bread to her children. . . . The future belongs to Germany, to which Austria will attach herself if she wishes to survive."

Reich gives many other quotations to support his main thesis, judgment on which I must now leave to my readers. It was as follows, and it must be remembered that it was written more than seven years ago:

> "The actions of a nation like the Germans are, in the first place, influenced by their state of mind; and, given that that state of mind in Germany is now one bordering on absolute *megalomania,* or the most morbid form of self-conceit and swel'ed-headedness, it is safe to conclude that their actions, too, will soon assume forms of the most daring self-assertiveness and aggression." (9)

While opinions differ as to the personal responsibility of the Kaiser for this war, it seems to me that he so fully typifies in his own character, actions and behavior, the megalomania of the nation that it is nothing less than absurd to describe him as reluctantly pushed into the war and as struggling until the last moment for peace.

The Kaiser is in all probability a neuropsychopathic, said to have a chronic and recurring infection of the middle ear (a not unknown cause of grave cerebral disease), and evincing many symptoms of the condition known as paranoia, in which there are usually present more or less definite systematized delusions, the other mental processes remaining approximately normal. If in such case the insane premises of the paranoiac are admitted, his conclusions will often legitimately follow. If the Kaiser *is* Kaiser by Divine decree, by the direct appointment of God, as he has repeatedly asserted, he cannot be blamed for thinking, as he has often shown that he does think, that whatever he does is right. But is it possible in the year 1914 that a quite sane person can believe, as the Kaiser surely does believe, that he is God's special appointee—appointed to rule over and guide the destinies of sixty millions of people? I have no doubt the Münsterbergs will have some answer to that question that will—to them—be psychologically satisfying. But I defy them to answer it to the satisfaction of the American people.

That this mental condition is compatible with unusual ability, with a high degree of personal charm, with the efficient performance of work and discharge of duties outside the sphere of delusion, has been repeatedly and abundantly shown and is a matter of everyday experience with alienists.

The history of the world also presents many examples of individuals not entirely sane, like Joan of

Arc, and Luther, who were able greatly to influence—largely through their profound belief in themselves and their cause—the course of human events.

One of the best illustrations of the "delirium of grandeur" with which the Kaiser appears to be afflicted (and with which on account of its frequency in ordinary lunatics all medical men are familiar) is given in this very belief in his Divine vice-gerency and in his constant and familiar references to God in his speeches, letters and telegrams.

The Dean of American letters, Mr. William D. Howells, has dealt so eloquently with this phase—and other phases—of the Kaiser's character (North American Review, October, 1914) that I shall let him continue this answer to the second portion of Question 1—believing that the Kaiser represents in an exaggerated form (due probably to disease), the megalomania of the nation, and believing also that what Mr. Howells writes of him represents with equal truth the estimate of him held to-day by the large majority of Americans.

> "As early as August 22nd the censorship of war news allowed us to learn that 'the Kaiser had ordered the Supreme Council of the Evangelical Church throughout Germany to include the following prayer in the liturgy at all public services during the war: 'Almighty and merciful God of the armies, we beseech in humility for Thy Almighty aid for our German fatherland. Bless the entire German war force. Lead us to victory and give us Thy grace that we may

show ourselves to be Christians toward our enemies. As well, let us soon arrive at peace which will everlastingly safeguard our free and independent Germany.'

"This carefully worded supplication must have been instantly rushed to the Throne of Grace, to the Father of Mercies, to Him without whose knowledge not even a sparrow falls to the ground, and the response might seem to have been instant, for we read that on the 25th the Kaiser wired his daughter-in-law, the Crown Princess:

" 'I rejoice with thee over the first victory of Wilhelm. God has been on his side and has most brilliantly supported him. To Him be thanks and honor. I remit to Wilhelm the Iron Cross of the second and first class. . . . God protect and succor my boys. Also in the future God be with thee and all wives.

'(Signed) PAPA WILHELM.'

"But in some respects this was apparently asking too much. In spite of the flattering recognition of His support of the Crown Prince, He seems to have thought it enough to be only with the Crown Princess 'in the future.' He evidently could not be bothered to look after '*all* wives,' for we read that the wives of unarmed peasants and citizens were driven, with their children, from their homes in a country which Papa Wilhelm was wasting with fire and sword through a violation of its rights as a neutral nation and of his own word solemnly given, and went wandering beggared through their native land. Other wives were slain at their hearthstones by Papa Wilhelm's artillery, or torn to pieces in their beds by bombs dropped from Papa Wilhelm's dirigibles flying over sleeping towns.

"So far as 'all wives' were concerned, the Helper of the widow and the orphan was not so constant as Papa Wilhelm desired, though Papa Wilhelm had especially commended them to His care, Yet Papa Wilhelm did not lose heart, for in a telegram of the 27th we find him declaring from his headquarters on the Main, 'Confidence in the irresistible might of our heroic army and unshakable belief in the help of a living God, together with the consciousness that we are fighting for a worthy cause, should give us faith in an early delivery of Germany from its enemies.'

"It may be that the Supreme Being, the 'living God' as the first of living men here handsomely calls Him, was perhaps not really so very hand-in-glove with the Kaiser. It may be that He did not 'brilliantly support' the Crown Prince in battle, and that it was solely 'the invincible might of his heroic army' which gave the Kaiser early victory. For Papa Wilhelm had been training them in their work of multiple murder for forty years, incessantly, relentlessly, at the cost of the best years of their youth, of their freedom, of whatever makes life sweet and dear. To perfect the pitiless machine into which he turned a kindly people he spared no means known to the art of the oppressor; he sacrificed to this end truth and honor and the love of men; he substituted the terror of lèse majesté for patriotic loyalty; he made revenge and hate the prime motives of the nation which he welded into an adamantine mass to be hurled, when the time came, against another nation which he had schooled them, in the uttermost cruelty of fear, to abhor. In this work he signed promises which trusting nations took for treaties with all the sacred and solemn guarantees, but which his ministers called 'scraps of paper' when the convenient time came. He

made their commanders the terror of the men, and he perpetuated among the officers of his army the code of the duel; by his will the law of the sword became supreme against the law of the land in any question between soldiers and civilians. He turned the tide of civilization from its flow toward peace and good-will, and drove its stream back among the morasses of the past, where it was choked with the corpses of the immemorial dead, the embers of their homes, and the ruins of their altars, so that when the time came to destroy a peaceful city his soldiers were as ready to do his will as they were to drive the wedge of their bodies through the enemy's lines and to fall in heaps that stayed their advance.

"There is no means of telling just yet what the effect of his prayers has been with the Heavenly Father, or whether in the event they will avail against the prayers of the Belgians, the French, the English, and the Russians, beseeching the same God for victory against him. Who, indeed, always excepting the German Emperor, may declare what dwells in the will of the Almighty, or what His purpose is? Will He continue His brilliant support of the Crown Prince, or will He lift up His countenance and make it to shine upon the peoples who have, humanly speaking, been cruelly outraged in all that is dear to civilized men, whose lands have been overrun by invading armies, whose cities have been burned, whose fields have been laid waste, whose wives and little ones have been driven beggars into the wilderness which wanton invasion has made of their country? At the actual writing it seems as if the Creator of heaven and earth may have thought twice concerning His imperial *protegé,* and ceased to 'bless the whole German force.' Part of this force is now retracing its bleeding steps,

> slowly indeed, and perhaps not finally; its retreat may be merely the recoil of the wild beast for another spring upon its prey; but as yet it does not seem so, and humanity may begin to breathe again. No one except the Kaiser may guess at the unfathomable counsels of the Ancient of Days."

It seems unnecessary to multiply evidence that the Kaiser has a form of megalomania that amounts to disease, or that he, unfortunately, in this respect, represents with fair accuracy, the present frame of mind —probably only temporary—of the German nation.

But I shall add one additional bit of testimony, just at hand. It may be untrustworthy, but it has the earmarks of genuineness.

An order issued by "Papa Wilhelm" to his troops in East Prussia is said (10) to read in part as follows:

> "Thanks to the valor of my heroes, France has been severely punished. Belgium, which interfered with our attack, has been added to the glorious provinces of Germany. From the course of military events you know that the punitive expedition into Russia has also been a brilliant success.
>
> "My heroes, the hour of trial has now come for you and for the whole of Germany. If Germany is dear to you—if your families are dear to you—if your culture, your faith, your nation, your Emperor, are dear to you, you will offer the enemy worthy resistance."

I ask the reader to note the crescendo—from "Germany" through "families," "culture," "faith,"

and the "nation" up to the "Emperor!" Also the announced addition of Belgium to the "glorious provinces of Germany."

The Kaiser may not have written this, but, if he didn't, the author takes rank with Chatterton. There is a "condensed novel" in those paragraphs worthy of Bret Harte or Leacock.

But, after all, the question of the exact mental condition of the Kaiser is not of fundamental importance. His power is unquestioned, his leadership indisputable. He stands to-day before the world as the embodiment of the spirit of the school of the Bernhardis and Treitschkes. He is the apotheosis of the Münsterberg idea of an Emperor as "the symbol of the State."

The world believes that had he so willed this war would not have occurred. Whether his will to war was—however indefensible and brutal—a sanely reasoned determination, or the irresistible impulse of a mental defective the world may never know. As I have said, *now* it is not important.

II

What is the evidence as to the events immediately leading up to the war in their relation to the culpability of Germany?

A. As I was trying to formulate my ideas in reply to this question, there appeared in the public press (11) a most illuminating and convincing article from the pen of one of the leaders of the American Bar, Mr. James M. Beck. He propounds at the outset three questions: Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia? Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France? Was England justified in declaring war against Germany?

He reviews in a masterly manner all the official and documentary evidence now before the world, and assumes that it is to be presented to a "Supreme Court of Civilization" for consideration and judgment.

In reply to the last of these questions he cites the solemn treaty of 1839, whereby Prussia, France, England, Austria and Russia "became the guarantors" of the "perpetual neutrality" of Belgium, which treaty was reaffirmed by Count Bismarck, then Chancellor of the German Empire, on July 22, 1870, and even more recently (1913) by the German Secretary of State, who said in the Reichstag:

> "The neutrality of Belgium is determined by international conventions, *and Germany is resolved to respect these conventions.*"

To confirm this solemn assurance, the Minister of War added in the same debate:

> "Belgium does not play any part in the justification of the German scheme of military reorganization. The scheme is justified by the position of matters in the East. *Germany will not lose sight of the fact that Belgium neutrality is guaranteed by international treaties.*"

A year later, on July 31, 1914, Herr von Buelow, the German Minister at Brussels, assured the Belgian Department of State that he knew of a declaration which the German Chancellor had made in 1911 to the effect "that Germany had no intention of violating our (Belgium's) neutrality," and "that he was certain that the sentiments to which expression was given at that time *had not changed.*" (See Belgian "Gray Book," Nos. 11 and 12.)

Mr. Beck says it seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard of these solemn obligations and protestations, when the present Chancellor of the German Empire, in his speech to the Reichstag and to the world on August 4, 1914, frankly admitted that the action of the German military machine in invading Belgium was a wrong. He said:

> "We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. *Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. . . . The wrong, I speak openly—that we*

> *are committing* we will endeavor to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have one thought—*how he is to hack his way through.*"

Mr. Beck might have added that by this same treaty Belgium had pledged herself to *resist* any violation of her neutrality, and that it was not only her right but her duty to bar the way to the march of Germany's legions across the land. Mr. Beck continues as to the German Chancellor's "defence" by saying that it is not even a plea of confession and avoidance. It is a plea of "Guilty" at the bar of the world. It has one merit—that it does not add to the crime the aggravation of hypocrisy. It virtually rests the case of Germany upon the Gospel of Treitschke and Bernhardi, which was taught far more effectively by Machiavelli in his treatise, "The Prince," wherein he glorified the policy of Cesare Borgia in trampling the weaker States of Italy under foot by ruthless terrorism, unbridled ferocity and the basest deception. The wanton destruction of Belgium is simply Borgiaism amplified ten thousand fold by the mechanical resources of modern war.

As to this point, Mr. Beck concludes that unless our boasted civilization is the thinnest veneering of barbarism; unless the law of the world is in fact only the ethics of the rifle and the conscience of the cannon; unless mankind after uncounted centuries has

made no real advance in political morality beyond that of the cave dweller, then this answer of Germany fails to show a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind." Germany's contention that a treaty of peace is "a scrap of paper," to be disregarded at will when required by the selfish interests of one contracting party, is the negation of all that civilization stands for.

> "Belgium has been crucified in the face of the world. Its innocence of any offence, until it was attacked, is too clear for argument. Its voluntary immolation to preserve its solemn guarantee of neutrality will 'plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against the deep damnation of its taking off.' On that issue the Supreme Court could have no ground for doubt or hesitation. Its judgment would be speedy and inexorable."

Mr. Beck then goes on to discuss the evidence offered to the public in the British and German "White Papers" and the "Russian Orange Paper," and asks what verdict an impartial and dispassionate court would render upon the issues thus raised and the evidence thus submitted. He says:

> "Primarily such a court would be deeply impressed not only by what the record as thus made up discloses, *but also by the significant omissions of documents known to be in existence.*
>
> "The official defence of England and Russia does not apparently show any failure on the part of either to submit all of the documents in their possession, *but the German 'White Paper' on its face discloses*

the suppression of documents of vital importance, while Austria has as yet failed to submit any of the documentary evidence in its possession.

"We know from the German 'White Paper'—even if we did not conclude as a matter of irresistible inference—that many important communications passed in this crisis between Germany and Austria, and it is probable that some communications must also have passed between those two countries and Italy. Italy, despite its embarrassing position, owes to the world the duty of a full disclosure. What such disclosure would probably show is indicated by her deliberate conclusion that her allies had commenced an *aggressive* war, which released her from any obligation under the Triple Alliance."

His conclusion as to this point is that until Germany is willing to put the most important documents in its possession in evidence, it must not be surprised that the world, remembering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian war, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of Germany's mediatory efforts.

He then reviews the entire diplomatic correspondence, as published, repeatedly calling attention to the absence of important documents from the German and Austrian records. He finds that those two nations were guilty not only of concealment or suppression of portions of the record, while Germany was pretending to lay its case unreservedly before the world, but that they were "diplomatic pettifoggers" who took a "colossal snap judgment"; that the Ger-

man Secretary of State was guilty of a "plain evasion," the German Imperial Chancellor of a "pitiful and insincere quibble," of "hypocrisy," of "arrogance" and "unreasonableness." Of one contention of the German Secretary of State, that Austria might act in disregard of Germany's wish in a matter of common concern, he says:

> "This strains human credulity to the breaking point. Did the German Secretary of State keep a straight face when he uttered this sardonic pleasantry? It may be the duty of a diplomat to lie on occasion, but is it ever necessary to utter such a stupid falsehood? The German Secretary of State sardonically added in the same conversation that he was not sure that the effort for peace had not hastened the declaration of war, as though the declaration of war against Servia had not been planned and expected from the first."

Mr. Beck does not fail to call attention to the fact that—

> "In reaching its conclusion our imaginary court would pay little attention to mere professions of a desire for peace. . . ."
>
> "No war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending that his nation wished nothing but peace, and invoking Divine aid for its murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a noted occasion when Sir Joseph Surface talked much of 'honor,' it might be as well in such instances to leave the name of God out of the question."

The Judgment of the Court he says would be unhesitatingly as follows:

"1. That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Servia in a matter affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to Servia, and Europe, insufficient time to consider the rights and obligations of all interested nations.

"2. That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time effectively exerted that influence. On the contrary, she certainly abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course.

"3. That England, France, Italy and Russia at all times sincerely worked for peace, and for this purpose not only overlooked the original misconduct of Austria, but made every reasonable concession in the hope of preserving peace.

"4. That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the right of any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian armies did not cross the border or take any aggressive action no other nation had any just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar preparations.

> "5. That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failure to demobilize when the other Powers had offered to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the war."

He adds that—

> "The German nation has been plunged into this abyss by its scheming statesmen and its self-centred and highly neurotic Kaiser, who in the twentieth century sincerely believes that he is the proxy of Almighty God on earth, and therefore infallible."

Since his article appeared, another labored defence of Germany has been sent to America, and, fathered by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, at one time the German Colonial Secretary, and said to be "now Germany's most conspicuous advocate in the United States," has been given to the American press. It still further illustrates many of the points already made. For example, it speaks again of the mythical French attack upon Germany across Belgium, resting the assertion "upon absolutely unimpeachable information," which it does not give. Such attempts as have been made to sustain this eleventh-hour defence are, so far as I have seen, like many of those in the German "White Paper," based on similarly vague and unsupported statements. The whole effort in this last lengthy and involved document is to try to show that Russia is "responsible for the war," that England

"was fully cognizant of this fact," and that the latter's "claim that she entered this war solely as the protector of small nations is a fable."

So far as I know, no such claim has been made by England. The word "solely" is interpolated to make the German case stronger. In fact, in the reply by the English professors and men of science to the learned men of Germany responsible for "The Truth About Germany" (page 87), the former say with emphasis:

> "Great Britain, together with France, Russia, Prussia and Austria, had solemnly guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. In the preservation of this neutrality *our deepest sentiments and our most vital interests are alike involved.* Its violation would not only shatter the independence of Belgium itself: it would undermine the whole basis which renders possible the neutrality of any State and the very existence of such States as are much weaker than their neighbors. *We acted in 1914 just as we acted in 1870.*"

But if the claim had been made, it would have had greater inherent probability and would be far more strongly upheld and substantiated by the admitted facts than is this last absurd effort to represent Germany as resisting "with quiet politeness" a demand, "as a price of British neutrality" to consent to her own "humiliation" and "retirement from the position of a Great Power."

Is it likely that a nation—or two nations—obviously, as events have shown, unprepared for immediate war would have made such a demand upon the greatest military Power the world has ever seen, at a time when, as events have also shown, she was ready to the last apparently petty detail to challenge, if need be, United Europe? Does not every intelligent person in the world know that her early successes, on the offensive, were due to this very preparedness, which her opponents could at the time but feebly imitate? And since then, in her remarkable defensive campaign, was not her temporary safety assured by these same preparations, so complete last August that it is scarcely conceivable that they could have been bettered by or through delay?

But even in this paper the same clumsy confusion between "Might" and "Right" which has put Germany on the defensive before the civilized world is once more shown. I wish I had space to quote in full that part of this "Review of Official War-Papers." It speaks of the "heavy heart" with which Germany, "following the law of self-preservation," "decided to violate the neutrality of Belgium." It says that after England had informed the Belgians—as by solemn contract and by every law of honor and decency she was bound to do—that she would support them in case "Germany applied pressure to induce them to depart from neutrality"—England's own words—"Belgian fanaticism broke loose against Germany."

Can Americans read with any patience the Ger-

man expressions of *ex post facto* regret—the hypocritical assumption that they are discharging a sacred duty?

> "By nobody," says the *Kölnische Zeitung* (close to the Berlin authorities), "is the fate of Belgium, the burning down of every building, the destruction of Louvain, so deeply deplored as by the German people and our brave troops, who felt bound to carry out to the bitter end the chastisement they were compelled to inflict."

Every burglar who, caught red-handed and resisted, added murder to his other crimes, might with equal force "deeply deplore" the "necessity" that "compelled" him to "inflict chastisement."

It is nauseating.

And through it all outcrops at all sorts of malapropos times their insufferable self-appreciation.

> "We, however," say the Berlin *Tageszeitung*, "do not need to regard the public opinion of the world. In the last instance the German people, united with the Emperor, are alone competent to decide the correctness of Germany's course."

The plea of "necessity" constantly recurs in the German *apologiae,* and was symbolized and summarized by Gerhart Hauptmann, the German dramatist, in his reply to an appeal from the Frenchman, Romain Rolland, author of "Jean Christophe":

> "Our jealous enemies forged an iron ring around our breast and we knew our breast had to expand, that it had to split asunder this ring, or else we had to cease breathing."

Translated into plain English, dear reader, this is as if your neighbor Schmidt, his family having somewhat outgrown the modest residence in which he began housekeeping, had called God to witness that in the Holy name of Family it was necessary for him to take your house and that of his other neighbor Claretie (and some of your outlying farms), and that it was also necessary (under God's guidance) to get at you through the property of a third neighbor, Vandervelde, which property, as the latter objected and resisted, it was further necessary to burn and destroy together with many of Vandervelde's children and his wife.

Chesterton has well summed up the German ethics. They have been told by their politicians that all arrangements dissolve before "necessity." That is the importance of the German Chancellor's phrase, excusing and explaining the violation of the neutrality of Belgium: "We are now in a state of necessity and necessity knows no law." He did not allege some special excuse in the case of Belgium, which might make it an exception to the rule. He distinctly argued, as on a principle applicable to other cases, that victory was a necessity and honor was a scrap of paper.

> "The Prussians had made a new discovery," says Chesterton, "in international politics—that it may often be convenient to make a promise and yet curiously inconvenient to keep it. . . . They, therefore, promised England a promise on condition that she broke a promise and on the implied condition that the new promise might be broken as easily as the old one."

This, after all, well summarizes an important part of the German "diplomacy."

To return to Mr. Beck's paper, I beg to say finally that I have quoted some of his conclusions without his arguments, because, while the latter were incapable of satisfactory condensation, within my limits, I wanted to call particular attention to the impression made on the highly trained mind of one representative American by the documents on which the German and German-American special pleaders largely rest their case.

III

What has been the attitude of the German apologists in relation to Belgium since the violation of neutrality?

A. Professor Weber, of Kiel, said to be "very close to Prince Henry of Prussia and the Hohenzollern family," writes to an American friend (12):

> "It has been proved with certainty that Belgium had already entered into agreements with France long before the war to permit the passage of hostile troops through Belgium, perhaps even to take the field with them against us.
>
> "By this means Belgium had already surrendered her neutrality and had actually taken a stand with our enemies. That we with one bold blow should dare to take the Belgium fortress is, therefore, easy to understand. We have been far too lenient in that we wished to give back to the Belgians their land unharmed after the fall of Liege.
>
> "Since the Belgians were so deceived as not to accept this magnanimous offer, they must bitterly atone for it."

As usual, nothing worthy of being called "proof" has been adduced in support of this statement and admiration for the "magnanimity" which led Germany to offer to give back to the Belgians their own land must be withheld.

Dr. Herman Hilprecht says that the Belgian Government "stubbornly declined the German proposition"—to allow the latter to violate the treaty of neutrality—and then attempts to justify fully and without reservation the subsequent over-running of Belgium and the pillage and destruction of Louvain. (13)

Much precisely similar testimony might be adduced, chiefly from German-American sources, and would amply suffice to show the mistake of the American writer who said (14):

> "The government of Germany has announced that 'the occupation of Belgium is now virtually complete'; and the people of the empire are celebrating the achievement with pride and exultation. Thus is closed one of the bloodiest chapters in the war—and one of the darkest chapters in the records of international dishonor.
>
> "No matter what horrors may await the world in the unfolding of the dreadful conflict, none can exceed in poignant tragedy the fate of this devoted people. From the time of Cæsar the bravery and the dauntless independence of the Belgians have been celebrated by historians and sung by poets. And now these high qualities have inspired a supreme demonstration of heroism and sacrifice which makes all humanity the debtor of the martyred nation.
>
> "This is the one phase of the war which can be discussed almost without raising controversy. Upon the issues of Prussian policy, French hatred, British jealousy and Russian plotting, advocates on either side wax furiously eloquent and raise questions which their opponents are taxed to answer.

> "But upon the hideous wrong perpetrated upon Belgium the most ruthless devotee of militarism, the most fanatical exponent of imperialistic destiny and the rights of 'culture,' must take refuge in silence or falter out feeble extenuation. The facts of history, the records of diplomacy and the principles of international justice converge here to denounce an act unparalleled in its cruelty and perfidy."

Unfortunately, since this was written, the imperialistic and "cultured" fanatics have shown that they have no idea of taking refuge in silence, but fatuously believe that they can impose upon a thinking and reasoning world a view that it has already contemptuously and with practical unanimity rejected.

The same writer gives a brief outline of the case (from a slightly different standpoint from that of Mr. Beck), brings it down to date, and continues:

> "This [the treaty of 1839, etc., see p. 35] was the record upon which Belgium stood when the troops of the Kaiser crossed her frontiers on August 2 last. The German government, having already violated the territory of Luxemburg, demanded passage for its forces through the country whose integrity it was sworn to honor and protect. With unblushing effrontery it called this demand a request for 'friendly neutrality,' and declared that in case of opposition Germany would 'consider Belgium as an enemy.'
>
> "There was here a double crime. Germany not only foreswore her own covenant, but undertook to penalize Belgium for observing that country's solemn obligation; for, of course, consent by Belgium to the

free passage of the Kaiser's forces would have been a repudiation of the treaty by Belgium and tantamount to an act of war against France.

"Apologists for the invasion have attempted to set up two defences. The first is that France was preparing to violate the treaty, and that Germany simply forestalled her. Fortunately, there are records which utterly disprove this pretence. After Germany's ultimatum, France offered the services of five army corps to Belgium to defend her neutrality. The answer was:

" 'We are sincerely grateful to the French government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. The Belgian government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take.'

"Belgium preferred to make her first appeal to Germany's sense of honor, and, when that failed, to the heroic resistance of a wronged people. And France was so ill-prepared for the invasion which Germany says she plotted that ten days elapsed before she had her forces in the neutral territory.

"The second excuse offered in *ex post facto* palliation of the offense is that in the Belgian archives Germany has found dispatches showing that in 1906 the British military attaché and the Belgian general staff discussed tentatively plans for landing a British force to defend Belgian neutrality if it were attacked. It shows the desperate nature of the German case when this incident is cited to justify a brutal invasion.

"The arrangement for giving help to Belgium, if needed, was discussed at the time Germany had thrust herself to the verge of war with France over Morocco; and the proposal of Great Britain to defend

> the neutrality of Belgium, as she was bound to do, was as creditable as Germany's violation of that neutrality was dishonorable.
>
> "All the eloquence and sophistries of the professors, poets, and psychologists advocating the German cause cannot remove the black stain of this deed. The facts are irrefutable, and the proof of guilt inexorable."

It seems not worth while further to elaborate the evidence as to the criminal and altogether indefensible position in which Germany finds herself in regard to Belgium. She has forfeited the respect of the civilized world. Her "promises" and "pledges" and "guarantees" will, as long as the present ruling class is in power, be regarded with contempt or derision by other nations. So far as the Belgian question relates to America, however, I have nowhere seen the issue better expressed than by Mr. Joseph C. Fraley, of Philadelphia, who, in a brochure entitled "How and Why a War Lord Wages War" (which all Americans should read), says:

> "We know that the one hope of stopping wars, is to supply a world wide sanction for the support of international laws and morals. We have nothing to do with the reasons which led certain powers to engage that Belgian territory should be neutral in time of war. We have everything to do with this particular instance of treaty breaking, in that it constitutes a new departure, a crime against all neutrals. Treaties made for peace conditions are ob-

> viously liable to be broken in war, but a treaty made with special reference to war, belongs to that class of obligations whose infringement is like cheating at cards. The offender gets no second chance."

And yet it takes a German-American (Jastrow) to say that the historian of the future will, in analyzing the causes of the war, regard the neutrality of Belgium " as a very minor factor, perhaps entirely negligible"!

IV

Is there any evidence which tends to show why the present time was selected by Germany to precipitate the war?

A. Professor Usher, the author of "Pan Germanism" (where much interesting matter corroborative of the statements of Emil Reich, as to Germany's megalomania, may be found presented in a more dignified way), has best answered this question in an article on "The Reasons Behind the War." (15)

In the first place, Austria for centuries has dreamed of dominating southeastern Europe, of ruling the Balkans, of possessing a seacoast on the Adriatic and Ægean. Only the control of Servia can give her fully and unreservedly what she desires. Moreover, under Servia's leadership, once she had recovered from her great losses in men and resources during the Balkan wars, a strong Slav state might have been established in control of all Austria's present approaches to the Adriatic. Her motives seem plain, and she was in precisely the position, after the murder of the Arch-Duke Ferdinand, to serve as a cat's-paw for her "ally"—and master. But why did the latter push her relentlessly into war at this time, when ample reparation was offered and further amends were easily procurable, as the evidence shows beyond all

question? The Anglo-Irish difficulties, the Canadian-Hindu troubles, the sensational disclosures in the French Chamber as to the bad condition of the army, the alleged deficiencies in the French aeroplane squadrons, the only partial recovery of Russia from the effects of the Japanese war, the exhaustion of the Balkan States themselves from their recent wars, even the preoccupation of the United States with troubles in Mexico, all seemed to preclude the chance of a general interference.

Professor Usher continues:

> "If such interference took place and a general European war resulted, there had not been in twenty years anything like as favorable an opportunity for the Triple Alliance or one as disadvantageous for the Triple Entente. The stake was so immense, the results of success would be so stupendous, so out of proportion, in the case of the Triple Alliance, with what they might lose, that the issue of war might even be courted with some assurance. . . .
>
> "The schemes of the Pan-Germanists indeed reach to the creation of a vast confederation of states. . . . reaching 'from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, from the Baltic to the Mediterranean,' as one of their slogans has it. . . .
>
> "Of this great scheme (supposing it to be, as many claim, the veritable secret policy of the Triple Alliance) the undisputed possession of the Balkans by the Triple Alliance is the most important single factor. . . .
>
> "As to a general assault upon the Triple Entente, the Triple Alliance has long seen two obvious

methods, both in the opinion of many, likely to be successful; the one, a long waiting game where the rapid growth of the population in Germany, Austria, and Italy, and the decline of the rate of growth in France, England, and Russia, would in time give the Alliance a real preponderance in numbers; the other, a short quick blow at some moment when the Triple Alliance could bring all its strength to bear and when the Triple Entente could not. The former meant, not improbably, many years of waiting, and in those years much might happen.

"Thoroughly alive to the situation, the Triple Entente had already under execution the preliminaries of so vast an increase of offensive force, and showed such a determination to maintain a naval and military preponderance, that there would be no alternative but waiting, once these schemes were perfected. The French, and particularly the Russian, army was to be increased, not only in size, but in efficiency and equipment; and an influential minority in England, with apparent popular support, was agitating conscription. The English navy was to be much increased in fighting force by manning at war strength in the near future a much larger proportion of ships than ever before. Chiefest of all, the Russians were building in the Baltic a really formidable fleet, capable of contesting the Baltic with Germany and of threatening the rear of the German fleet in the Atlantic to such an extent that united fleet action in the North Sea would become an impossibility.

"If they [the Triple Alliance] were to fight at all, they must fight now. Next summer might be too late. Now the actual offensive force of their rivals was proportionately less than it might be again for ten years, and their difficulties at home were collec-

tively and individually greater than any of the three has seen for a generation.

"So far as the fulfillment of the schemes of Pan-Germanism was concerned, the moment was more than opportune and might not return."

Professor Usher seems to me to have sufficiently answered Question IV.

V

What are the principles represented by the opposing forces in this war?

A. They are absolutism and militarism on the one hand and democratic liberty and representative government on the other.

For a century a transference of political power from military despots to popular assemblies has been going on in western Europe. In Russia and the Far East the same gradual shift of forces has been taking place. France and Portugal are republics. England is democratic. Japan has abandoned feudalism for democracy. China is an experimental republic. Russia has her Duma. Servia has fought for self-government. The people of Italy have shown their real sentiments by keeping her from fighting against the Allies. Belgium has a growing and intelligent democratic minority of its population. At this critical tide in the affairs of the world the inmost feelings of the peoples involved, the beliefs and aspirations that are a living part of their very being are apt to dominate and often—though I admit, not invariably—determine their action.

What is the alignment?

On one side Germany—with whose ideals and purposes we are familiar—Austria, not a real nation,

but an artificial conglomeration of heterogeneous peoples, the mere tool of Germany, and Turkey, now, as always, the type of a corrupt fanatic Oriental despotism.

On the other, France, England, Belgium, Servia, Portugal, Russia, Japan.

And ranged on their side, so far as sympathy goes, are the democratic neutral powers, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Holland, Italy and the United States.

"The Outlook," which has admirably summed up the foregoing facts, says editorially (August 29, 1914):

> "When in a chemical experiment certain molecules by a natural attraction combine, that fact shows that they have something in common. When, in such a war as this, France, England, Belgium, Portugal, Japan and Russia combine, that fact shows that these various peoples have something in common. We believe that something in common is a passionate desire for democratic liberty.
>
> "The victory of Germany can be no other than a victory for militarism; the victory of the Allies no other than a victory for permanent peace. If Germany wins she must maintain her armaments, if not increase them; for power obtained by force can be maintained only by force. If Germany is defeated, a diminution of her armaments as a condition of peace may well be demanded by the Allied Powers."

VI

In addition to the evidence already presented as to the mental attitude of the average German toward his own race and toward other European races, are there any facts tending to show his real attitude toward America?

A. If in answering this I come back again to Bernhardi and Treitschke, it is because I believe it has been shown that, in spite of eleventh-hour denials, they truly represent the Germany of 1914—the Germany of this war. How much of the mistaken "devotion" of the German nation at this time is due to their teachings and to those of their class it is impossible to state dogmatically. But that they have greatly influenced their compatriots there can be no doubt.

Let us see what these "Pan Germanists" have to say to their fellow-countrymen about America. Bernhardi says (16) that in our efforts at The Hague Congresses and, in recent times, our attempts to conclude treaties for the establishment of Arbitration Courts, we have not pacific ideals as the real motive of our actions, but "usually employ the need of peace as a cloak under which to promote" our own political aims. He goes on:

> "We can hardly assume that a real love of peace prompts these efforts. This is shown by the fact that precisely those Powers which, as the weaker, are ex-

posed to aggression, and therefore were in the greatest need of international protection, have been completely passed over in the American proposals for Arbitration Courts. It must consequently be assumed that very matter-of-fact political motives led the Americans, with their commercial instincts, to take such steps, and induced perfidious Albion to accede to the proposals. We may suppose that England intended to protect her rear in event of a war with Germany, but that America wished to have a free hand in order to follow her policy of sovereignty in Central America without hindrance, and to carry out her plans regarding the Panama Canal in the exclusive interests of America. Both countries certainly entertained the hope of gaining advantage over the other signatory of the treaty, and of winning the lion's share for themselves. Theorists and fanatics imagine that they see in the efforts of President Taft a great step forward on the path to perpetual peace, and enthusiastically agree with him. Even the Minister for Foreign Affairs in England, with well-affected idealism, termed the procedure of the United States an era in the history of mankind."

"The United States of America, *e. g.*, in June, 1911, championed the ideas of universal peace in order to be able to devote their undisturbed attention to money-making and the enjoyment of wealth, and to save the three hundred million dollars which they spend on their army and navy."

"In America, Elihu Root, formerly Secretary of State, declared in 1908 that the High Court of International Justice established by the second Hague Conference would be able to pronounce definite and bind-

ing decisions by virtue of the pressure brought to bear by public opinion. The present leaders of the American peace movement seem to share this idea. With a childlike self-consciousness, they appear to believe that public opinion must represent the view which the American plutocrats think most profitable to themselves."

"While, on the one side, she [America], insists on the Monroe doctrine, on the other she stretches out her own arms towards Asia and Africa, in order to find bases for her fleets. The United States aim at the economic and, where possible, the political command of the American continent, and at naval supremacy in the Pacific."

So much for Bernhardi.
Treitschke says: (17)

"To civilization at large, the Anglicising of the German-Americans means a heavy loss. . . . Among Germans there can no longer be any question that the civilization of mankind (*Gesittung der Menscheit*) suffers every time a German is transformed into a Yankee."

No wonder that the Ridders and Münsterbergs and Hilprechts and Jastrows seek to belittle Bernhardi and Treitschke and their teachings as a preliminary to the conciliation of America. But I fear that the transformation of the representative of "Kultur" into the despised Yankee takes place much less frequently than we had supposed.

The reason it does not take place oftener is not far to seek, once one recognizes that our German-Americans are still under the influence of the "Fatherland."

There can be no doubt that German and American political ideals are absolutely divergent. They have already come into conflict over South America, the Panama Canal and the Philippines. Calwer, a German socialist, says that preliminary to a socialistic economic organization of the world, "Capitalism must first bring the world under subjection," and adds:

> "It follows that capital—including German capital as well—must first go forth and subdue the world with the means and weapons which are at its disposal," *i.e.*, with fire and sword.

The same sort of thing crops out wherever their bureaucrats write. Herr Schlettewein, a Government Colonist expert, when asked to instruct the Reichstag on the principles of colonization, said:

> "In colonial politics we stand at the parting of the ways—on the one side healthy egoism . . . on the other exaggerated humanitarianism. *The Herreros must be compelled to work, and to work without compensation and in return for their food only. Forced labor for years is only a just punishment, and at the same time it is the best method of training them.*"

How long would an American governmental employé remain in public life after expressing that sentiment to Congress?

Curiously enough the fundamental idea of our American republic, the idea for which the War of the Revolution was fought, the idea for the preservation of which to-day Americans would unhesitatingly lay down their lives, is known to political philosophers and historians as "the Teutonic idea."

It is the irreconcilable conflict between that idea and the mediæval ideas of a people willing to be governed by a Hohenzollern that prevents the more frequent metamorphosis of a German into a "Yankee."

Professor McElroy has shown (18) that the "Teutonic idea"—the idea of representative government—dating back to the earliest days of European history, gradually overwhelmed on the Continent by the Roman idea (of government from above), except in the highlands of Switzerland and the lowlands of Holland, survived in the British Isles. It was kept alive at Runnymede, and by Simon de Montfort's parliament and against it, he says, "The despotic Tudors, the treacherous Stuarts and the dull Hanoverians struggled in vain."

It throve in the American Colonies and the American Revolution started it upon a new and glorious career. Almost at once the representative idea was restored in England, and in France emerged, "after centuries of complete obliteration, in a revolutionary movement that shook Europe from end to end."

Professor McElroy continues:

"It has since spread rapidly. Wherever the British flag has appeared the Teutonic idea has been planted and its roots carefully nourished. It is a plant of slow growth; but it is worth the trouble of careful cultivation. No man can deny the fact that, with all the faults of administration, and they are many and grave, often written in letters of blood, the flag of England and that of her own flesh and blood, the United States, have been followed always by the idea and practice of representative government. We may criticise the Boer war; but we know that as soon as the Boers were subdued they were told to govern themselves. Men may question the propriety of American intervention in Cuba; but no one can deny that we voluntarily stood aside, after gaining full possession of the island, and invited her people to select representatives and manage their own affairs. In the elaboration of this idea one need not argue; one need only invite attention to the facts which are patent to all men. Whatever we may think of England, therefore, we know that the great Germanic idea of government 'of the people, by the people, and for the people' follows her flag.

"But what of Germany under the hegemony of Prussia? Prussia has been throughout her history, as her greatest publicist, Professor Hans Delbrück, has phrased it, a *Kriegsstaat.* Her history is all military history. In reading it we miss the story of the glorious conflicts for the people's right to a share in the government. There are no Runnymede barons, no Simon de Montforts, no Oliver Cromwells, no Abraham Lincolns, in the history of Prussia. Slowly,

but with a grim and terrible certainty, the iron hand of the Prussian war lord has brought the German nation to exactly the position to which King George III attempted to bring England and the American colonies. In Germany the Teutonic idea is dead. A mixed race, more Slavonic than Teutonic, the Prussian, has deprived the German people of their birthright. There, as Professor Cramb strikingly phrases it, 'Corsica . . . has conquered Galilee.' The ideals of Prussia remain to-day just what they were in the days of the Great Elector—ideals of absolute monarchy—and the German Empire has accepted them. 'The German people,' wrote Charles Sarolea in 1912, 'are governed more completely from Berlin and Potsdam than the French were governed from Paris and Versailles. In theory, every part of the Empire may have a proportional share in the administration of the country; in reality, Prussia has the ultimate political and financial control.' And it is to maintain and extend this half-Slavonic military despotism calling its war chief the 'anointed of the Lord' that the Germans are giving their lives."

VII

What is the attitude of German-Americans toward this war and toward the principles involved?

This has been and is one of the great surprises of the war to most Americans. It is unnecessary to say that we value our German-American citizens, and thought that in times of stress in the future, as in the past, they would demonstrate that they were as democratic and as truly American as any of us. It was quite common to hear the expression from Americans that this was a "Prussian war," a "Kaiser's war," a "War Lord's fight," and that the "German people" had our sympathies, though we hoped Germany would lose. In Mr. Fraley's brochure, already quoted from, he says eloquently:

> "Oh, Great People of South and Middle Germany; brave, kindly, lovers of the peaceful arts, lovers of liberty; you, who as you march, are singing of homes in Schwabenland and Bayerland, and where the grape blooms on the Rhine; how long will you sacrifice not only your blood and treasure, but your sacred honor, to uphold this spirit of inexorable militarism, foisted upon you under the pretense that through it your dear Fatherland may be at rest, but whose real purpose is that a Prussian shall write himself *Imperator et Rex?*"

If we thought this of portions of the German nation itself, it may be understood how much more confident we were as to the sentiments of the Germans who had become part of our own family. But we were soon to be undeceived.

At the present moment the American people might with some show of accuracy be divided into Americans and a subdivision of what the newspapers call "Hyphenated-Americans."

This subdivision seems to consist chiefly, if not entirely, of a certain number of Teutonic accessions to our citizenship—*i. e.*, of "German-Americans." What numerical relation it has to the whole body of useful and valued American citizens of German birth or ancestry it is just now impossible to determine. The classification I suggest would rest upon three chief characteristics: 1. A pronounced tendency to unfriendly or contemptuous criticism of the United States. 2. Undiscriminating sympathy with and support of the actions of Germany before and during the present war. 3. An effort to arouse anti-British prejudice among Americans.

The so-called German-Americans who do not belong in the group thus defined may be in the large majority. I hope they are. But thus far they have scarcely been heard from, while the others are almost daily appealing to Americans for intellectual and moral aid and countenance. That their appeals are often tactless, frequently untruthful, and sometimes insulting, is an interesting phenomenon which is deserving of study.

In a biological investigation certain factors would be at once considered if the cause of a particular racial or tribal peculiarity were being sought for. Chief among these factors would be heredity and environment, the latter including the customary diet with the sources of food supply. This would be true whether the peculiarity were physical or psychical—*i. e.*, whether it was, for example, a matter of stature and complexion or a matter of belief and religious observance. Similarly, the food that may have helped to produce it would be of interest to the investigator, whether it were for the body or for the mind—*e. g.*, whether clay-eating causing the swollen belly of the Digger or Chauvinistic literature causing—to use the vernacular—the swollen head of the "world power or perish" German.

Viewed from this standpoint the phenomenon in question seems to admit of easy explanation. The influence of heredity is, of course, obvious and unmistakable. Thus far the overwhelming majority of the apologists—little or big—for Germany in this country are of German birth or descent. It is rare to find an American name prefixed or appended to an article or communication calling for the sympathy of Americans for Germany in this crisis, or asking them to "suspend judgment," or appealing for "fairness and moderation," or extolling the bravery, the self-sacrifice and the high moral purposes of the Germans; or even narrating the extreme consideration shown them in Germany after the outbreak of the war.

Coupled with their articles is not uncommonly abuse of American methods, attempts to show that we have ourselves been guilty of crimes no less abhorrent than those with which Germany is charged, assertions that our indignation is hypocrisy and that the overwhelming anti-German sentiment of the country is due to lying newspapers influencing a hysterical populace.

One "German-American" journalistic "conciliator" who seems to be especially charged with the duty of combating and modifying the prevailing deep and spontaneous sympathy for the Allies actually attributes the public expressions of this sympathy to our hypocrisy and untruthfulness.

This would be inexplicable if it were not for certain facts that throw upon it an illuminating sidelight.

We have already seen the attitude of many German writers toward this country. It is obvious that they have been supplying not only to Germans, but also to German-Americans, the mental pabulum which has nourished in the latter the combined sentiment of worship of militarism and dislike for the ideals of the country of their adoption. This seems extravagant, and it is certainly surprising that such a statement could have even a slight basis of truth. But listen to Münsterberg: (19) "In the German view the State is not for the individuals, but the individuals for the State."

And again:

> "Those men who have achieved the marvelous progress of German civilization have done it in the

conviction that the military spirit is a splendid training for cultural efficiency. The university professors have always been the most enthusiastic defenders of the system. . . .

"Germany is not understood by those who fancy that defeat would tear an abyss between the people and the emperor. There is no room in Germany for a president. The idea of a president is that he draws his power from the will of the millions of individuals. The idea of the emperor is that he is the symbol of the State as a whole, independent from the will of the individuals, and therefore independent of any elections. In the symbol of the crown, far above the struggles of partisan individuals, lies the idea of the German nation."

Here are some more quotations from "German-Americans": (20)

"The overwhelming majority of the Germans give their heartiest support to their far-seeing and wise monarch."

"Modern Germany with all her great achievements is inseparable from the Germany of military discipline, and would never have come into existence without the support of a strong, steadfast and determined government. The 'two Germanys' must stand or fall together, for the German people and their Kaiser are one!"

"The German people are as inseparable from their Kaiser as we in America are from our Constitution."

"The whole German people are practically unanimous in the opinion that the monarchical form of

government, with great authority and strongly centralized, is the best for them. Even the great Social Democratic party is organized upon this principle, and does not in the least resemble a Democratic party in the American sense of the word."

The *Kölnische Zeitung* (21) publishes a letter from a German—or German-American—resident in this country, as to the events immediately following the outbreak of the war:

"These were glorious days! . . . A holy wrath breaks over us, the *furor teutonicus*. All Germany flames up like a powder-mine. . . . Who is not for us is against us. And they were all, all against us, America the most furious. Search history as you will, you will not find a page that records the like of what appears in these days in the American press. They write with Indian arrowheads and for ink use viper's venom. Has ever one member of the family of nations ventured to employ against another such a mode of speech, especially when that other was locked in a most sanguinary strife?

"And America is a neutral State! . . . Americans, with left-handed meaning, speak of the Kaiser as 'the War Lord.' And for the honest Yankee there is no more ghastly title than this. For it sounds better to play the peace waltz! On all the editorial organs they play now only one melody: Germany is the world's champion peace-buster (*Allerweltsstörenfried*), and when peace is broken the freedom of the people is beaten into fragments. . . . A land, a people, a nation, is the prey of the Amer-

ican vultures of the press. For these conveyers of culture there is no such thing as honor of country, people, or nation."

Price Collier throws some light on the matter as regards the German *Germans* when he says: (22)

"In order to build up his patriotism the German has been taught systematically to dislike the Austrians, then the French, now the English, and let not the American suppose that he likes the American any better, for he does not."

Pére Didon also helps when he writes: (23)

"J'ai essayé maintes fois de découvrir chez l'allemand une sympathie quelconque pour d'autres nations; je n'y ai réussi."

But the most illuminating comment is made in another portion of Collier's book, where he sums up his views as to the entire Germanic system:

"There is no such thing in Germany as democratic or representative government.

"The orderliness of the Germans is all forced upon them from without, and is not due to their own knowledge of how to take care of themselves.

"German State socialism is, in a nutshell, the decision on the part of the rulers that the individual is not competent to spend his own money, choose his own calling, use his own time as he will or provide for his own future or the various emergencies of life.

By minute State control they are rapidly bringing the whole population to an enfeebled social and political condition, where they can do nothing for themselves. . . . There are 3,000,000 officials, great and small, in Germany, and 14,000,000 electors, or, roughly, one policeman to every five adults.

"I have said that the population is well fed, well clothed and well looked after. Of course they are. No slave owner so maltreats his slaves that they cannot work for him. But is man fed by bread alone? . . . "The electors, now so flattered by the smooth phrases of their tyrants disguised as liberators, will one day be aghast to find themselves in a veritable house of correction paid for from their own savings.

"The very barrenness of the soil, the ring of enemies, the soft moral and social texture of the population, have, so their little knot of rulers think, made necessary these harsh, artificial forcing methods. The outstanding proof of the artificiality of this civilization is its powerlessness to propagate. Germans transplanted from their hothouse civilization to other countries cease to be Germans; and nowhere in the world outside Germany is German civilization imitated, liked or adopted.

"Autocracy, bureaucracy and militarism are triplets of straw, not destined to live. They are precocious children, teaching the pallid religion of dependence upon the State and enforcing the anarchical morality of man's despair of himself.

"Germany has organized herself into an organization, and is the most overgoverned country in the world. Life is to live, not to think, after all. This is where the metaphysician invariably fails when he mistakes thinking for living, when he mistakes organiza-

tion, which can never be more than a mold for life, for life itself.

"Germany has shown us that the short cut to the government of a people by suppression and strangulation results in a dreary development of mediocrity. She has proved again that the only safety for either an individual or a nation is to be loved and respected; and in these days no one respects slavery or loves threats."

Another American writer, after making this quotation, adds: (24)

"Such is the true meaning of the system which has produced the modern Germany of machine-like efficiency, of a governmental philosophy founded upon force, of universal submission to undemocratic ideals. It is a picture to sadden all admirers of the race which has wrought such benefits to mankind.

"Yet this is the system which patriotic Germans in America insist is necessary. The fruits of German energy and genius, they say, are due not to racial capacity, but to the crushing out of individualism and the surrender of national liberty to the purpose of creating a glorified State.

"In plain terms, they declare the astonishing theory that the German people are incapable of progress under democratic institutions, but have become great in the mass only because they have subordinated the nation's will to an intelligent officialdom and ordered their lives to the commands of a militaristic discipline."

Among other unamiable peculiarities our German-American citizens have developed is one already

alluded to, a determined effort to arouse anti-British feeling by reference to all the occasions when there has been war or dispute between the two countries from the time of the Revolution down to the Venezuelan incident.

But this is as clumsy, as ineffective and, I think, as distasteful to most Americans as their equally uncouth attempts at flattery.

They forget that America has never been the home of "grudges"; that every important incident they cite, even the most recent, belongs to the period of generations that have passed away. They forget that the greatest war of the last century, between two sections of our own country, has been, so far as continued rancor and bitterness are concerned, as completely forgotten as if it had occurred in the time of the Crusades. They forget that the ideals of the English-speaking people the world over are at once the most democratic and the nearest to successful realization that the world has ever seen, and that our brothers in the French Republic have their faces steadfastly set toward the same goal.

They forget that our present differences—if there are any—are trivial and superficial, while our likenesses are flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone.

They ignore the fact that the fairest and most penetrating analysis of our country, our methods and our people ever written was from the pen of an Englishman, Viscount Bryce; and that the most sympathetic and impartial story of our War of Independence

was told by an English historian, Sir George Trevelyan. They are stupid enough to forget the incident in Manila Bay in 1898, when the German Admiral Von Diederich, after a series of petty and provocative infractions of the blockade established by Admiral Dewey, approached Admiral Chichester, in command of the British fleet, to learn what he would do if further disregard of Dewey's orders were shown. But the American people have not forgotten Admiral Chichester's reply to the effect that he "would do whatever Dewey wanted him to do."

Nor have they forgotten that at that very time Germany was endeavoring to bring about an "understanding" among European powers that would result in interference on behalf of Spain.

Our German-American quarrel makers do not know doubtless, but many of us know, that in the "Strangers' Room," of the chief Liberal Club of London, a room where all visitors are shown, there hangs in the place of honor over the mantel a framed facsimile of our Declaration of Independence, while above it is a medallion with the superimposed silhouettes in low relief, of Washington, Lincoln and Grant. In the same room the Magna Charta occupies a less conspicuous position.

Fortunately, they are about as likely to disturb or even to affect the relations between England and this country as their "Fatherland" is to realize its insane dream of "World Power."

They are circulating the speeches of some unim-

portant irreconcilables like Ramsay McDonald in opposition to the war. Why don't they quote the communications of the German Humanity League of Berlin, to the British Humanity League, in which the Kaiser is characterized as "the uncurbed tyrant, surrounded by parasites, and now directing the most desperate, devilish and selfish campaign ever waged against humanity," and as "the despot whose insatiable egotism is drenching Europe with the blood of its workers and wage earners?" (25)

Perhaps Münsterberg's book, "The War and America," best illustrates the fatuity of the German-American apologists as well as their awkward and stupid mixture of unpalatable flattery and unfriendly criticism.

The book has been admirably dissected by a recent reviewer. (26). Professor Münsterberg has received so much undeserved attention from our American journalists that it seems worth while to quote portions of this review.

> "His method of argument seems directed at a singularly untrained public. . . . His major premises he never takes the pains to substantiate. Instead, he reiterates them as axiomatic. 'Culturally, Russia is Asia,' Russia desires to blot out Western European civilization, hence Germany is fighting for civilization against barbarism, in an inevitable conflict. These fundamental notions are drummed in with Prussian thoroughness. But these are just the postulates that a thoughtful reader wants to have proved.

. . . Aside from bandying big impressive antitheses—Teuton and Slav, Europe, Asia, etc.—Professor Münsterberg varies his tactics by condescending flattery of America; and by occasional excursions in pure sentiment. The whole *mélange* is highly seasoned, and possibly grateful to the literary palate of the very simple reader for whom it is concocted.

"The omniscient tone of the plea is characteristic. . . . Such a generalization as that Europe means thought while Asia means feeling, and accordingly one must cut the other's throat, is admirably calculated to solve the vexed problem of West and East—in any corner grocery store. And for whom does Professor Münsterberg limn the picture of an idyllic, scholarly, industrial, unaggressive, and wholly pacific Germany reluctantly kept under arms by bellicose neighbors? Plainly, for a reader who has not heard of the partition of Poland, the seizing of Silesia, the grasping of Schleswig-Holstein, the annexation of Hanover, the retention of Alsace and Lorraine, and, only yesterday, the premature incorporation of Belgium into the German Empire.

"Then what kind of a reader is asked to swallow whole the theory of a ruthlessly aggressive Russia menacing all Western Europe? Evidently, a reader who does not know that, first, Russia set conquered Germany on her feet, then Austria threatened by the Hungarian revolution—a reader who does not know that in a hundred and fifty years, when Russia was strong and Central Europe a congeries of weak states, Russia showed no exceptional aggressiveness against European Powers.

. . . "We must note the kind of philosophical thought that underlies the surface rhetoric. It is a philosophy not overtly expressed. It would hardly

bear ventilation in America. You may sense it in the sharp distinction between 'routine agreements like the neutrality treaties,' and a 'pledge of international honor' like the Triple Alliance. Why is there no pledge of honor in a neutrality agreement? Plainly because it is made with and in behalf of a weak Power. Honor first begins among peers. Thus is honor made in the Germany of Zabern.

"Again consider the system of international morals implied in the following:

" 'It was the ethical duty of the Russians to strain every effort for the expansion of their influence, and it was the ethical duty of the Germans and Austrians to strain every effort to prevent it. In the same way, it was the moral right of France to make use of any hour of German embarrassment for recapturing its military glory by a victory of revenge. And it was the moral right of England to exert its energies for keeping the control of the seas and for destroying the commercial rivalry of the Germans. No one is to be blamed.'

"International morality, that is, consists in the insensate inevitable clash of national egotisms, which, being national, are holy. . . .

"We have left dangling the very interesting question: For what kind of a reader is this skillful blend of dogmatism, innuendo, sophistry, and gush intended? Fortunately, Profesor Münsterberg has the candor to make the matter clear. It is addressed to 'the American mind' which has an 'unusual degree of imitativeness and suggestibility.' It is addressed to the individual American who, when excited, tends to become 'a mere automatic mechanism in which the thoughts and feelings and impulses of his neighbor control his mind.' . . . 'There is a lack of indi-

> vidual resistance to prescribed opinions which produces in excited states a colorless wholesale judgment which may be entirely different from the natural stand of the sober single individual.' Elsewhere we learn that in all European matters the American is moved chiefly by a provincial prejudice against the paraphernalia and nomenclature of monarchy. He takes mere names for real things.
>
> "Professor Münsterberg has produced a book that is precisely adapted to impress the sort of 'American mind,' he thus defines, but no other sort."

Even in his latest text-book of Psychology he evinces the same insufferable belief in essential racial superiority, saying (p. 234):

> "The Southern peoples are children of the moment; the Teutonic live in the things which lie beyond the world, in the infinite and the ineffable."

I still, however, cling to the hope that the support at present undoubtedly given to the German cause by our German-American citizens is a temporary manifestation of the strength of the ties of blood, and that they as a class are not fitly represented by their present spokesmen. I cannot believe that, however they may have been influenced by heredity, by the poisonous teachings of the Bernhardis and Treitschkes and by the flamboyant but spurious patriotism of the Münsterbergs and Ridders and Hilprechts, they will permanently espouse a cause which is based upon the idea that "there is no room in Germany for a presi-

dent" for the reason that "the idea of a president is that he draws his power from the will of millions of individuals." It must be impossible that the kindly, sociable and lovable friends I have among the Germans, here and abroad, can subscribe to the ethics of the Kaiser as expressed to the German soldiers despatched to China in 1900:

> "When you meet the foe you will defeat him. No quarter will be given, no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns, a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Etzel (Attila), gained a reputation, in virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever again even dare to look askance at a German." (27)

The reference to Attila was commonly suppressed, but the rest of the quotation was circulated on postcards throughout Germany. (28)

Two days later the modern Attila preached a sermon on board the *Hohenzollern!* (29)

I may, of course, be mistaken, but until the mistake is demonstrated I do not intend to include in my condemnation of the present "German-American" attitude any but those who have publicly put themselves on record. As for them, they should abandon the pretense of being even "hyphenated" Americans.

VIII

How much reliance is to be placed upon statements emanating from Germany at this time?

We have been deluged with complaints of the "unfairness" with which Germany's case has been presented to the world, the "lies" that have been told about her, the "double facedness" of many of our newspapers. Even the German Chancellor—the same chancellor who on July 28th was, according to Mr. Beck, guilty of a "pitiful and insincere quibble," and whose Secretary of State on July 29th he says told a "stupid falsehood"—on September 2d, by authority of the Emperor, took the trouble to convey to the American people his confidence that it would not "allow itself to be deceived through the war of falsehood which our enemies are conducting against us."

We know what to think of the Chancellor's veracity. The small fry—the Münsterbergs and Hilprechts—are shrill in their clamorous accusations of unfairness and mendacity, including all their opponents and some of us. Dr. Hilprecht, Heaven save the mark, calls Sir Edward Grey an "arch deceiver," and accuses (30)

> "all our four principal enemies, against whom thus far battles have been fought—the Belgians, the English, the French and the Russians—government, sol-

> diers and population alike, of having wilfully, cowardly and cruelly, broken the sacred pledges given by their representatives at The Hague conference before God and mankind."

In support of one part of this statement, he says:

> "The British dum-dum cartridges taken from the first original package, opened in the presence of the war correspondents, show the inscription, 'Art. Dept. Ive.' at the bottom of their brass casings."

An archæologist should, of course, be an authority as to "inscriptions," but we need not regard this evidence as conclusive.

Fortunately, we have a better test of Germany's reliability as to truth at this juncture than could be afforded by either Chancellors or archæologists.

Perhaps the most astonishing effort to influence American opinion is the 73-page pamphlet entitled "Truth About Germany: Facts About the War." If it had been headed "Falsehoods About Germany: Lies About the War" the title would have been more accurately descriptive. Professor Lovejoy, of Johns Hopkins, has fitly characterized it as "a clumsy compilation of fictions, irrelevancies and vulgar appeals to what are apparently conceived to be American prejudices." He specifies some of the direct falsehoods:

> "1. The pamphlet (31) says that Austria-Hungary *was able to prove* that the Servian government had been responsible for the plan of the assassination at Sarajevo.

"2. Austria-Hungary addressed to the Servian government a number of demands which aimed at nothing but the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda. Servia was on the point of accepting the demand, when there arrived a dispatch from St. Petersburg, and Servia mobilized. Then Austria had to act. Thus arose the Austro-Servian war."

3. "Great Britain *asked that Germany should allow French and Belgian troops to form on Belgian territory for a march against our frontier . . . England and France were resolved not to respect the neutrality of Belgium* . . . (They) did not give up their plan of attacking Germany through Belgium."

4. "England aims at being mistress of the Old World in order to occupy either an equal, or a menacing, position towards the New World. *For this purpose she has encouraged this war.*"

Professor Lovejoy adds: (32)

"Every American recipient of the pamphlet who subsequently took the trouble to examine the entire published evidence in the case must have speedily discovered the statements of specific historical fact in the passages cited to be either direct falsehoods or *suggestiones falsi.* But it should be added that the publication in question is marked by a yet more singular *suppressio veri;* it contains no hint of what are perhaps the two most decisive of the 'facts about the war.' These, since they seem to have been less emphasized in America than they deserve to be, should perhaps be indicated specifically.

It is a fact undisclosed in the pamphlet that on

July 30, and again in a modified form on July 31, the Russian government communicated to the German government an undertaking to 'stop all military preparations' (or 'to maintain a waiting attitude') if Austria would consent to 'stay the march of her troops on Servian territory and, recognizing that the Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a question of general European interest, to admit that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Servia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian government without injury to her rights as a sovereign state and to her independence.'

"It is a fact equally undisclosed in this repository of information about the causes of the war, that on the morning of July 31, Sir Edward Grey declared to the German Ambassador in London that 'if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it,' he would 'support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it his Majesty's government would have nothing more to do with the consequences.'

"The most illuminating 'truth about Germany' is that, on the same day, with these two pledges before it, the government at Berlin sent to Russia and to France *ultimata* which were certain, and therefore were manifestly designed, to render war within twenty-four hours inevitable."

The pamphlet "Truth About Germany" was prepared by a Board of Editors which included many of the best-known men in letters, science, finance and Ger-

man public life. As Lovejoy says, the pamphlet seems to show that the very class that among cultivated persons of other countries has gained for Germany its greatest distinction,

> "has signally failed at the most critical moment in German history, to perform its proper function—the function of detached criticism, of cool consideration, of insisting that facts and all the relevant facts, be known and faced. It appears to be shouting with the rest for a wholly avoidable war of which, in nearly all non-German eyes, the moral indefensibility seems exceeded only by its fatal unwisdom from a purely national point of view."

It does not seem worth while to consider further the question of the credibility of recent German official and semi-official statements.

IX

What is the truth as to the "pre-eminence" of German "Kultur," of German civilization, of German achievement in letters, arts and sciences?

A. "Truth About Germany" was in itself sufficient, considering the representative character of its authors and editors, to raise grave doubts as to the value of German "culture" unless one could be both cultured and untruthful. But much broader views of this subject have been taken by Professor Brander Matthews (33) and by Professor Ramsay:

After expressing his surprise that scholars like Eucken and Haeckel should be possessed of the conviction that Germany is the supreme example of a highly civilized state, and the undisputed leader in the arts and sciences which represent culture, Professor Matthews continues by pointing out that

> "Certain things seem to show German 'culture' a little lacking in the social instinct, the desire to make things easy and pleasant for others, an instinct which is the dominating influence in French civilization. . . . It is to the absence of this social instinct, to the inability to understand the attitude of other parties to a discussion, to the unwillingness to appreciate their point of view, that we may ascribe the failure of German diplomacy, a failure which has left her almost without a friend in her hour of need. And success in diplomacy is one of the supreme tests of civilization.

"The claim asserted explicitly or implicitly in behalf of German culture seems to be based on the belief that the Germans are leaders in the arts and in the sciences. So far as the art of war . . . and so far as the art of music are concerned, there is no need to cavil.

"But what about the other and more purely intellectual arts? How many are the contemporary painters and sculptors and architects of Germany who have succeeded in winning the cosmopolitan reputation which has been the reward of a score of the artists of France and of half a dozen of the artists of America?

"When we consider the art of letters we find a similar condition. Germany has had philosophers and historians of high rank; but in pure literature . . . for a period of nearly sixty years—only one German author succeeded in winning a world-wide celebrity—and Heine was a Hebrew, who died in Paris, out of favor with his countrymen, perhaps because he had been unceasing in calling attention to the deficiencies of German culture. . . . No German writer attained to the international fame achieved by Cooper and by Poe, by Walt Whitman and by Mark Twain. And it was during these threescore years of literary aridity in Germany that there was a superb literary fecundity in Great Britain and in France, and that each of these countries produced at least a score of authors whose names are known throughout the world. Even sparsely settled Scandinavia brought forth a triumvirate, Björsen, Ibsen and Brandes, without compeers in Germany. And from Russia the fame of Turgenef and of Tolstoy spread abroad a knowledge of the heart and mind

of a great people who are denounced by Germans as barbarous."

As Heine is the one German who has been pre-eminent in literature these many years, it is interesting, in view of recent happenings, to recall what he wrote seventy-eight years ago:

"Christianity—and this is its highest merit—has, in some degree, softened, but it could not destroy, that brutal German joy of battle. When once the taming talisman, the Cross, breaks in two, the savagery of the old fighters, the senseless Berserker fury of which the northern poets sing and say so much, will gush up anew. That talisman is decayed, and the day will come when it will piteously collapse. Then the old stone gods will rise from the silent ruins, and rub the dust of a thousand years from their eyes. Thor, with his giant's hammer, will at last spring up, *and shatter to bits the Gothic cathedrals."!!*

Professor Matthews thinks that in the field of science, pure and applied, the defenders of the supremacy of German culture will probably take their last stand. He goes on:

"That the German contribution to science has been important is indisputable; yet it is equally indisputable that the two dominating scientific leaders of the second half of the nineteenth century are Darwin and Pasteur. It is in chemistry that the Germans have been pioneers; yet the greatest of modern chemists is Mendeleef. It was Hertz who made the dis-

covery which is the foundation of Marconi's invention; but although not a few valuable discoveries are to be credited to the Germans, perhaps almost as many as to either the French or the British, the German contribution in the field of invention, in the practical application of scientific discovery, has been less than that of France, less than that of Great Britain, and less than that of the United States. The Germans contributed little or nothing to the development of the railroad, the steamboat, the automobile, the aeroplane, the telegraph, the telephone, the phonograph, the photograph, the moving picture, the electric light, the sewing machine, and the reaper and binder. Even those dread instruments of war, the revolver and the machine gun, the turreted ship, the torpedo, and the submarine, are not due to the military ardor of the Germans. It would seem as though the Germans had been lacking in the inventiveness which is so marked a feature of our modern civilization. . . .

"Nations are never accepted by other nations at their own valuation; and Germans need not be surprised that we are now astonished to find them asserting their natural self-appreciation, with the apparent expectation that it will pass unchallenged. The world owes a debt to modern Germany beyond all question, but this is far less than the debt owed to England and to France. It would be interesting if some German, speaking with authority, should now be moved to explain to us Americans the reasons which underlie the insistent assertion of the superiority of German civilization. Within the past few weeks we have been forced to gaze at certain of the less pleasant aspects of the German character: and we have been made to see that the militarism of the

Germans is in absolute contradiction to the preaching and to the practice of the great Goethe, to whom they proudly point as the ultimate representative of German culture." . . .

He adds finally: "The most obvious characteristic of a highly civilized man is his willingness to keep his word, at whatever cost to himself. For reasons satisfactory to itself Germany broke its pledge to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg and of Belgium. It is another characteristic of civilization to cherish the works of art which have been bequeathed to us by the past. For reasons satisfactory to itself Germany destroyed Louvain, more or less completely. It is a final characteristic of civilized man to be humane and to refrain from ill-treating the blameless. For reasons satisfactory to itself, Germany dropped bombs in the unbesieged city of Antwerp and caused the death of innocent women and children. Here are three instances where German 'culture' has been tested and found wanting."

Professor William Ramsay (34), whose position in the scientific world is of the very highest, says:

"The originality of the German race has never, in spite of certain brilliant exceptions, been their characteristic; their *métier* has been rather the exploitation of the inventions and discoveries of others; and in this they are conspicuous. . . . The aim of science is the acquisition of knowledge of the unknown; the aim of applied science, the bettering of the lot of the human race. German ideals are infinitely far removed from the conception of the true man of science."

He asks—as to the result of the annihilation of the present ruling German despots:

> "Will the progress of science be thereby retarded? I think not. The greatest advances in scientific thought have not been made by members of the German race; nor have the earlier applications of science had Germany for their origin. So far as we can see at present, the restriction of the Teutons will relieve the world from a deluge of mediocrity. Much of their previous reputation has been due to Hebrew residents among them; and we may safely trust that race to persist in vitality and intellectual activity."

X

What are the duties of America at this time?

It seems to me a very narrow and indeed a somewhat discreditable view of the *duty* of America at this time, which would confine us to strict "neutrality" in both word and deed. The former is, of course, practically impossible. The habit of saying what we think is too ingrained to be abandoned by reason of a Presidential or any other decree or proclamation. And what many Americans think is that we have ourselves been offended, injured, flouted by Germany's actions, beginning with the violation of the Belgian neutrality.

There is in existence a document to which the United States of America is one of the signatories. Another signer is the German Emperor. This document embodies the results of The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Mr. Muirhead, of London (35), has discussed in a most interesting manner the situation arising from the existence of this paper. One of its sections (Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land) consists of a recitation of the practices which the signers solemnly undertake to abstain from in the prosecution of a war. Among the provisions in this code are the following:

Undefended towns shall not be bombarded (Article 25; also Article 1 of Naval Code).

Pillage is expressly prohibited (Articles 28 and 47).

Illegal contributions must not be levied (Articles 49 and 52).

Militia and volunteer corps enjoy the rights of belligerents (Article 1).

The seizure of funds belonging to private persons or local authorities is prohibited (Articles 46, 53 and 56).

Collective penalties for individual acts are forbidden (Article 50).

Every effort must be made to spare buildings dedicated to public worship, art, science or charitable purposes (Article 56).

The terrorization of a country by outrages on its civilian population is forbidden (Article 46).

It is forbidden to make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag, of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, or of the distinctive signs of the Geneva Convention (Article 23); and it is forbidden to kill or mutilate the wounded, or to kill and wound by treachery (Article 23).

The weight of evidence that Germany has flagrantly violated most of these regulations is overwhelming, even if we omit those in the last paragraph as difficult to prove and peculiarly liable to exaggeration.

Mr. Muirhead continues:

"The question, then, seems to arise obviously and inevitably: What is the position in these circumstances of the other signatories to the code?

"The United States of America was not one of the guarantors of the neutrality of Belgium. Hence, whatever may have been the feelings of its citizens, it was not, as a nation or government, legally called on to interfere. True, the action of Germany was a direct attack on the principles of liberty and independent nationality, of which the United States of America is rightly considered as one of the greatest protagonists. But it may be granted that civilization has not yet progressed so far that intervention on a purely ideal ground can be held to be a matter of practical politics—even for a country with 90,000,000 inhabitants, and wealth beyond the dreams of avarice.

"But unless the 'scrap of paper' theory is to be applied indiscriminately to all contracts and treaties between nations, what is the exact meaning of the signatures of other Powers, including the United States, to the decisions of The Hague conference? Do they mean only a promise that the signatory will itself observe those decisions? Or do they go further, and involve the obligation that each signatory State shall, so far as lies in its power, enforce the observance on any signatory that violates them? It cannot be maintained that such an obligation goes so far as to involve undertaking war for the purpose of enforcing observance, but surely it involves *some* effort to procure it? Can a great nation afford to put its name to a document and then stand by in icy neutrality while that document is being torn to shreds by another of the high contracting parties? Is the conduct of Germany in this regard really as

> much a matter of indifference to the United States of America as to China or Abyssinia? It is obvious that the signature of Germany is worthless, and that the signature of Great Britain is being honored. But has, or has not, the value of that of the United States of America been somewhat impaired? Germany's word was given to America as much as to England. Can America, then, consonantly with its dignity and honor, allow Germany to snap its fingers at her, and say, 'Well, what are you going to do about it?' "

Mr. Muirhead asks if the attitude of the United States of America should be, or must be, that of a neutral, equally friendly to both parties and waiting quietly for the chance to insinuate proposals of peace; or if the necessity of the case is not something wider and deeper than can be met by an ordinary peace based on comparatively unimportant mutual concessions? Is it not, he says, inevitably a fight to a finish, and is not the United States of America enormously interested in having that "finish" in one way only?

He expresses the hope that the Allies will need no material assistance from the United States of America in achieving their ends, but adds:

> "Those of us, however, who love America must pray that she will definitely declare herself on the side of popular liberty, if for nothing else than for the preservation of the full measure of our love and admiration."

In the early days of the war I was travelling in Alaska and in our Pacific northwest and Canada. I

talked with many Americans whom I met on trains or boats or at hotels. I did not find among them a single pro-German. But when I expressed the view, which I then absolutely held, that we—the United States—should help to make the issue of the war certain by promptly offering the Allies every assistance in our power, I found no one to agree with me.

I think I have noticed since then a steadily increasing and strengthening trend of public opinion in that direction. Now, when I express the same sentiments, nearly every second person acquiesces. Many Americans have publicly put themselves on record as favoring some form of intervention on behalf of the Allies. Some would be content with a protest against the violation of the Hague convention and an expression of opinion that would *officially* declare to the world, what the world already knows, the overwhelming sympathy of this country for the cause and the principles for which the Allies are fighting.

Others, among whom I am to be counted, are in favor of prompt recognition of the fact that for the sake of humanity and of civilization we cannot afford to permit Germany to win, and that the surest way of preventing it is to take sides at once. It seems a terrible thing to advocate war for one's own country when war might be avoided. But it is more terrible to think of the indefinite prolongation of the slaughter now going on and of the experiences of the coming winter now awaiting not only the combatants but the women and children and babies left without support

and shelter. If our intervention brought victory to the cause of the Allies a month earlier than it would otherwise come, it would be justified.

I am at one with Mr. Fraley, who, in the article I have twice quoted from (36), said:

> "Why not then take a hand at redefining, right now, whilst our action will be effective; saying to the War Lord: 'You have elected to ply your trade on these lines, but the business is at your peril. If you should be so unlucky as to shed American blood upon neutral ground, or even in an enemy's territory, at a point remote from battle and without due warning; or if an American should be harmed, in person or property, by a mine of yours upon the high seas; we shall hold it to be an act of war.'
>
> "'Advise' our fellow-neutral, Holland (whose present status is Germany's best asset), that it is contrary to the public policy of the world that Germany should have the benefits of Dutch neutrality for the entrance of supplies, whilst trampling on the obligations of neutrality towards her next door neighbor. Prohibit all shipments from the United States to Holland except upon the guarantee of the Dutch government that they shall not go beyond her border. Exert all our influence upon the public opinion of the world to denounce the War Lord as an enemy of the human race.
>
> "If Germany should resent this, how could we make good?
>
> "Send our Atlantic fleet to co-operate with the Allies in closing the Baltic, and take along, as supply ships and colliers, every German vessel now in our ports. We shall find some of them loaded already.

> "What precedent exists for such a notice and demand? The mouth of the War Lord is closed on the subject of precedents, but if we must have a formula to go by, wherein would our action differ, in spirit, from that which we have already done in Cuba and in Mexico?
>
> "We, the great Neutral Power of the World, who desire that all neutrality shall be alike effective and respected, find the situation intolerable. We know that the one hope of stopping wars, is to supply a world wide sanction for the support of international laws and morals."

I believe that to-day this expresses the view of a large and rapidly increasing number of Americans, and that before long the majority of our people will regard it as the duty of the President to protest against the disregard of treaties and the violation of conventions, and to make such protest so emphatic that there can be no doubt left in the minds of the Kaiser and the German people that the sympathies and, if necessary, the support of the United States are pledged to the cause of the Allies.

Dr. Charles Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard, in an address on "America's Duty in Relation to the European War" is quoted as saying (I have not yet seen the original address): (37)

> "With Germany, might made right. She made a violent attack on the weaker, because it was the shortest, the easiest way. What a blow this was to our idea of mercy, to our conception of the progress of

man from a barbarian to a civilized, fair, merciful being! We had hoped that the methods of war were capable of amelioration, but this war has blown all those hopes to the winds.

"All our hopes were shattered by Germany's action. All our American ideas of the right to life, liberty, property, happiness, were nullified by this nation, which is led by a ruler who has an archaic idea of his powers and of his relation to the world. Germany has shown us that in the most advanced nation, as far as science is concerned, there is no place for mercy, no place for good will and that hatred takes the place of good motives.

"We must bear in mind the deep obligations which this nation is under to England and France, so deep that it is vain to expect us to be in our hearts neutral. Can we think of giving no aid to France if she comes to the end of her resources; to England if she should be reduced to like straits?

"But let us not confuse our minds by failing to see whither the German policy tends. Let us not dream of abandoning our faith that human relations shall be determined by considerations of justice, mercy, love, and good will. We must help the Allies if our assistance is requested."

To quote the usually pacific "Outlook" (October 7, 1914), and with most cordial approval:

"To a nation that acknowledges no law but its own might, those nations that have a sense of honor and regard their obligations as binding, can only say: 'If only the sword will induce you to keep your word, we shall have to let the sword do its work. It will

be our business to see that the observance of treaties which we regard as a matter of honor, you shall find to be a matter of self-interest.'"

Professor G. B. Adams, of Yale, is reported (38) to have said recently:

"So much is at stake for civilization in this war that Germany must not be allowed to win it, even if it becomes necessary for the United States to enter the conflict on the side of the Allies. . . . Germany represents in government and institutions an obsolescent system away from which the world has been advancing for generations. . . . Germany must be defeated in this war. If it comes to the point when it is necessary for the United States to aid the Allies to the end that they should win, then I hope it will be done. She is opposed to everything for which we stand, and our turn would be next if Germany were successful."

Mr. Robert Bacon, ex-Ambassador from the United States to France, says: (39)

"Signs are not wanting that the people of this country are unwilling to submit much longer to the injunction laid upon them that our neutrality should impose upon us silence regarding aspects of the European war with which we have a vital concern. There are many men who consider that this nation is shirking its duty by maintaining a policy which may be interpreted as giving tacit assent to acts involving us morally and much more intimately than has yet been expressed. These men believe that we have a high

responsibility in upholding the treaties which were signed at the Second Conference at The Hague in 1907 and ratified by the United States and the nations now at war. . . .

"In The Hague convention referred to we have a real and intimate concern. That convention was signed by the delegates from the United States and ratified by the United States government, and it was signed and ratified by Germany, making it a treaty between Germany and the United States, in which the other ratifying Powers were joined.

"In admittedly violating Articles I and II of that convention Germany broke a treaty she had solemnly made and entered into with the United States.

"Are we to suffer a nation to break a treaty with us, on whatever pretext, without entering, at least, a formal protest? Will anyone contend that our neutrality imposes silence upon us under such conditions? Are The Hague conventions to become 'scraps of paper' without a single word of protest from this government? If the treaties which we made at The Hague are to be so lightly regarded, then why not all our other treaties? As a matter of fact, it is our solemn duty to protest against a violation of pledges formally entered into between this government and any other government, and we assume a heavy moral responsibility when we remain silent. In this crisis, particularly, other nations look to us and never, perhaps, has our example had greater force."

Professor Henry M. Howe, of Columbia University, has expressed (40) as follows the alternatives open to the United States:

"Are there not two courses now open to us which may direct the course of human affairs for centuries; the first to be neutral, while revictualling and rearming Germany as far as is possible through Holland and Scandinavia, and thereby increasing the chance of her reaching a position in which she can later conquer us and the rest of the planet, and meanwhile force us to become primarily military instead of industrial; the second to join the Allies and prevent Germany reaching that position, not only directly by our strength, but still more by withholding from her those supplies of food, ammunition and gasolene without which she must yield?

"Germany having now disclosed her wish to rule the planet, does she not know that this war will decide either that she shall reach a position in which she can carry out that wish or that the rest of the world recognizing this to be her wish, will combine to prevent her in perpetuity from reaching that position?

"And is not this knowledge one sufficient reason for her anxiety for our good will, lest we aid the Allies to prevent her reaching it?

"If we are to have a world alliance for restraining military aggression, should not that alliance be formed now rather than after the subjugation of the Allies shall have left no unsubjugated civilized powers collectively strong enough to restrain Germany? The world's present power to crush the aggressor suffices. If we allow this war to go against the Allies, shall we not thereby lose perhaps the last golden opportunity?

"If our danger seems remote, is not that because we have not given it thought?

"If the great work of the Allies is to prevent Germany becoming irresistible, is not this as neces-

> sary to our preservation as to theirs? If so, do not honor and dignity call on us to assume our share in the burden of this prevention?"

The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, with the annexed regulations, were signed by the direction of Colonel Roosevelt, then President of the United States, and expressed the practically unanimous sentiments of our people.

Colonel Roosevelt now writes: (41)

> "Most emphatically I would not have permitted such a farce to go through if it had entered my head that this government would not consider itself bound to do all it could to see that the regulations to which it made itself a party were actually observed when the necessity for their observance arose. . . . Of the present neutral powers the United States of America is the most disinterested and the strongest, and should, therefore, bear the main burden of the responsibility in this matter. . . . If they (The Hague Conventions) meant anything, if the United States had a serious purpose, a serious sense of its obligations to world righteousness when it entered into them then its plain duty (after proof of their violation has been obtained) is to take whatever action may be necessary to vindicate the principles of international law set forth in those conventions."

Professor William Gardner Hale, of Chicago, says (42) that as the second Hague Conference dealt with neutral powers everywhere in the world, and as

the agreement declared their territory "inviolable," and as this was agreed to by forty-two other powers (in addition to Germany and the United States), Germany's act in breaking the law did not concern England, France, Belgium and herself alone, *it concerned us.* "It was not merely a shameful act toward a brave but weak state, *it was an offence to us.*"

Professor Hale continues:

> "In a given country there is force to maintain the laws. As between countries, there has been no means. There is, in the technical phrase, no sanction. It is absolutely essential that there should be a sanction. There never can be any except force. That cannot be the force of the combatants. They are already engaged with all their might in the struggle. The law breaker will go on breaking. If he wins there will never even be any punishment. Our President has said that these questions will be taken up at the end of the war at The Hague. But if Germany wins there will never be any conference at The Hague. The Hague will be at the War Office in Berlin, and there will be no admission.
>
> "If the Allies conquer there will be a conference. The forty-four powers will take part. But even so, there can never be any security against further law breaking, except that powers which are strangers to the dispute should, the moment there is sure violation of the laws of war, throw in their strength against the guilty side. It will have to be some powerful nation, or nations, that do this. We are such a nation. Our fleet is the third in the world, though our army is small. Our resources, if brought into operation, are great. We are also a determined people.

"This is no small quarrel. The fate of the world hangs upon it. That which we ought some day to do we should do now; should have done already. Technical reasons, as well as moral reasons, we have in abundance. Solemn treaties made 'between the United States and other powers,' including Germany, have been broken by her. The breaking of a treaty is always a sufficient reason for a declaration of war if the offended party desires. We had a sufficient reason on the day on which the text of the German ultimatum to Belgium was published, even if we were doubtful about the ridiculous reason given. Germany's announcement that, if Belgium resisted the violation of her territory, Germany would regard her resistance as a hostile act, and treat the relations of the two countries thereafter according to the arbitrament of war, was enough. When precious historical monuments, which are in a very true sense the property of all mankind, began to be destroyed or to be gravely injured there was again enough. When an unfortified and undefended town was three times bombarded there was again enough. When the peaceful vessels of neutrals, as well as vessels of war, began to be blown up by floating mines there was once more enough. And, even if we did not make war, it was our duty at the very least to address a temperate protest to Germany. We did not protest. The love of fair play is inherent in the Anglo-Saxon race, as well as in most others. Even a crowd at a prizefight or a game will not tolerate repeated and deliberate foul play and wait to the end in the hope of adjudication. It will promptly drag the offending party out of the ring. But we do nothing.

"We are not a military nation and are not prepared. But our navy could at once have patrolled

> the seas and given security in the Atlantic. We could have kept the communications between France and England open. We could have guarded the English harbors. We could have set the English fleet entirely free to do its most important work, if it is in any way possible to do it—namely, to destroy the German navy. That once gone, Germany could never have built another until after peace was declared. She would have been heavily crippled. A declaration of war from us would also have at once shut off all American food from reaching Germany by any channel. We could also have sent at once a small army to the field. There was a time when a small additional force would have made a difference. We could have asked for volunteers. Hundreds of thousands would have offered themselves. We were not prepared, but Germany would have known that we were preparing. She would have seen that her cause was hopeless."

These quotations, representing the views of an ex-President of the United States, an ex-President of Harvard, an ex-Ambassador, a Yale professor, a Chicago professor, a Columbia professor and a Philadelphia lawyer, must serve to indicate the reasons for my belief that American public opinion now tends to favor some form of intervention, not from quarrelsomeness, certainly not for selfish motives or from desire for aggrandizement, but chiefly from the wish to have our country discharge a great international duty, thrust upon us by the irresistible force of circumstances, a duty, the proper discharge of which would make humanity our debtor for ages to come.

XI

What are the interests of America at this time?

I think many Americans must have blushed when they read Mr. Champ Clark's speech early in September and saw that he had said that we wanted to "encourage peace-making in the old world partly out of motives of humanity, but largely because we do not want to be injured." He certainly did not speak for the American people in placing that motive above all others.

Yet it is right that we should ask: What may we expect if Germany is victorious in this war?

We know the principles for which she stands. We know her disregard for obligations, spoken or written. We know her intention to gain "World Power" at any cost. Have we any reason to think that she would respect us, our wishes, our persons, our property?

Dr. Dernburg, the ex-Colonial Secretary, was, a few days ago, understood to have declared that Germany had announced its recognition of the Monroe Doctrine. (43) The Monroe Doctrine, as every American knows, dates back to 1828, when "certain European Powers showed signs of wishing to help Spain recover her lost American colonies." President Mon-

roe said: "We owe it therefore to candor . . . . to declare that we consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." That is the important part of the Monroe Doctrine. Fortunately the republics of South America have attained such size and strength that the further statement that we could not permit anyone to "oppress them" or to "control their destiny" might now well be modified to read that we would gladly aid them, if they needed aid, in resisting any such attempt.

Dr. Dernburg's statement was to be understood as an *assurance* that Germany did not intend to establish colonies in this hemisphere.

A little latter our State Department issued an announcement to the effect that the German Ambassador, Count von Bernstorff, had on September 3, 1914, in a note to the department "stated that he was instructed by his Government to deny most emphatically the rumors to the effects that Germany intends, in case she comes out victorious in the present war, to seek expansion in South America."

As "The Outlook" observes (November 4, 1914):

> "The sweeping statement of Dr. Dernburg is thus reduced to an official expression concerning Germany's intention with regard to South America. Thus it is seen that there was no pledge offered, but merely an expression of intention. And Americans must remember that intentions change. In the second place it related, not to the whole of the Western

> Hemisphere, but merely to South America. What Germany's intentions are with regard to North America, including Canada and the West Indies, was left to American imagination.
>
> "But not for long. One day later there was published a further statement by Dr. Dernburg, and a statement by the German Ambassador, Count von Bernstorff."

The latter said that a German invasion of Canada for a temporary foothold on this continent would not violate the Monroe Doctrine, and Dr. Dernburg said that by sending Canadian troops to the war, "Canada had placed herself beyond the pale of American protection."

He took pains to add that Germany would, however, extend her respect for South American territory to that of our neighbor to the north.

But can Americans afford to believe them? The papers are already asking whether "in the light cast upon German international policy by the Ems dispatch —forged or doctored, as one may choose to call it—by Bismarck to bring on the Franco-German war of 1870-71, and by the "scrap of paper" incident in this war, we can afford to adopt any policy in relation to Germany but that of extreme watchful waiting *and preparedness* for whatever events may happen in the near future."

I agree with the London "Spectator" (September 26, 1914):

> "Strange as it will sound to most American ears . . . it is none the less true that at this moment what stands between the Monroe Doctrine and its complete destruction are our ships in the North Sea and the battle-weary, mud-stained men in the British and French trenches on the Aisne."

We can get some information as to the probabilities in this direction from other sources. We have seen how accurately Bernhardi and Treitschke forecast the immediate future in their writings. There were other prophets in their country. The late Mr. W. T. Arnold, grandson of Arnold of Rugby, in a summary of the "German Professorial Campaign," quotes as follows from Dr. W. Wintzer's book, *"Die Deutschen in Tropischen Amerika":*

> "The moral core of the Monroe doctrine vanished on the day when the document concerning the annexation of the Philippines was signed by McKinley." He (Wintzer) claims "the right to confront this Greater-American doctrine with a Greater-German one"; and adds: "Equality of treatment with the United States in South America—that is the theory which we both on principle and as occasion serves, must oppose to the Monroe Doctrine and which, too, should the moment come, we must defend by force" . . . "The American order of 'Hands Off!' in South America must be answered in the negative.
>
> "Two of the Pan-German prophets of the future, *'Germania Triumphans'* and Dr. Eisenhart, represent Germany as fighting against both Britain and the United States, but fighting against them separately.

In *Germania Triumphans,* the United States are first attacked and defeated by both sea and land, and Britain is represented as chuckle-headed enough, and base enough to look on and do nothing. Then comes Britain's turn. The only difference in Dr. Eisenhart's vaticination of the future is that Germany take Britain first and the United States look on. Britain is disposed of, 'and now' says the prophet, 'it was time to reckon with America.' Not even these half-sane Pan-Germans contemplate the possibility of dealing with Britain and the United States together."

Price Collier (Op. cit., p. 547) says:

"In discussing Senator Lodge's resolution before the United States Senate, on the Monroe Doctrine, the German press spoke of us as 'hirnverbrannte Yankees,' 'bornierte Yankee-Gehirne, ('crazy Yankees,' 'provincial Yankee intellects'); and the words 'Dollarika,' 'Dollarei,' and 'Dollarman,' are further malicious expressions of their envy frequently used."

Schmoller, the political economist, writes:

"We must at all costs hope for the formation in *Southern Brazil,* of a State with twenty or thirty millions."

It is obvious, at this moment, showing through the recent "statements" and "announcements" of the highly placed Germans whom I have quoted, that at least the possibility of Germany's disregard of the Monroe Doctrine is present in their minds. Circum-

stances enjoin caution. Americans are to be placated —just now—not irritated or alarmed. Bernhardi, Treitschke, Wintzer, Eisenhart, Schmoller are to be repudiated.

But in view of her callous and brutal disregard of formal obligations, entered into with the majority of the civilized nations of the world, and in view of the many other reasons (p. 83) for doubting the reliability of German statements at this time, can any American contemplate with equanimity the possibility of this war ending in a *Germania Triumphans?*

Is that a prospect which, in view of what we know of the purpose, interest, determination, not only of the military caste, but, at least for a time, of the whole nation, Americans can regard with indifference or a condition which they can await with serenity?

Ferrero, the Italian philosophical historian, practically answers that question when he says (44):

> "This war will either increase still more the military caste in Germany or will largely destroy it. Germany is moved to the conflict with the expectation of repeating 1870: that is of making a rapid victorious campaign, the cost of which will be covered by the immense indemnities imposed upon the conquered. And if the General Staff succeeds in this enterprise, the German army, and the Hohenzollerns who are its leaders, will achieve such prestige in Germany, in Europe, and in the world, that no strength can oppose them."

But Professor Hale still more fully and specifically answers the question (loc. cit.):

> "What do we Americans pray for as the issue of this great struggle? Russia is autocratic, but she has abundantly produced men who eagerly suffered martyrdom for freedom. Germany did once, but has stopped. Nor does German America seem any longer to raise up citizens of the Carl Schurz kind, who rebelled against this very bureaucratic militarism that has produced the war. England, France and Belgium are democratic countries. Münsterberg (page 205) speaks of 'the tremendous increase of the monarchical conviction.' Von Bülow, for twelve years German Minister for Foreign Affairs, quotes with approval, in his just published 'Imperial Germany,' the statement, 'German parliaments, in a comparatively short space of time, mostly sink to the level of a district council,' and expresses his own conceptions in such sentences as: 'In history strong military States have always required monarchical guidance,' and 'In foreign as well as home politics I considered it my noblest task to the best of my understanding and ability to strengthen, protect and support the crown, not only on account of deep loyalty and personal affection for the wearer, but also because I see in the crown the cornerstone of Prussia and the keystone of the empire.' As for Austria, it was against this very Francis Joseph that Cavour planned, and Garibaldi fought, for Italian liberty. Which type of ideas do we want to see succeed?
>
> "The victory of the Allies would mean an English England, a French France, an Italian Italy, a Russian Russia, a German Germany. It would mean a

Europe of free nations, each developing its own characteristics and ideals. Germany would not, I hope and believe, even lose her foreign possessions, except the little one taken from China, which should be handed back. But she should be made to restore Schleswig-Holstein to Denmark and Alsace-Lorraine to France. She should be made to take her place as one of the family of equal nations, and not its mistress. And we should lend our strength at once, as well as our good wishes, to this end.

"The victory of Germany and Austria would mean a Germanized and bureaucratically controlled England, France, Russia and Italy; for Italy would not survive. It would be a world intolerable to live in, and intolerable for an American to think about. But thinking about it is not the only thing that he would suffer.

"The victory of Germany would put at her disposal an enormous fleet, consisting of all the ships that survived the war. Her ambition would not be sated. She aims at nothing less than world dominion. 'Deutschland über alles' does not mean 'with the exception of the United States.' She has known how to attack us. The moment she had a trained German personnel for her immense navy, South America, or as much as she wanted of it from time to time, would become a German colony. The nucleus already exists in Brazil, and could easily enough produce an excuse for war if one was thought desirable for historical purposes. To the winds would go the Monroe Doctrine and South American freedom. We, with our then relatively tiny navy, should be helpless, either to keep Germany off or to dislodge her. From South America she would strike at us. Our coasts would be at her mercy, and she could land her dis-

ciplined troops anywhere. The country would be full of spies, as France and Belgium are to-day. We should fight desperately, and our land is of great extent. But only disciplined armies can prevail in these times. Guerilla warfare is useless. Fighting would be done here by railroads and the reduction of great centres. The population of Germany and Austria is to-day larger than ours by some sixteen millions; and Germany, then the mistress of Europe, could safely bring an army into the field from many quarters, both of Europe and South America. The struggle would be bitter. We should have the advantage in distance; but the ocean is narrow to-day, as the presence of soldiers from all parts of the world on the battlefields of France has shown us. And Germany would have every other possible start upon us.

"This is no idle speculation. It is no more a nightmare than was the possibility of a Germanized Europe a few months ago. We should stop it all by throwing our strength now upon the side of the Allies.

"I have put my arguments on the basis of Germany's breaking of international law. But I will put it also on another basis. War must come to an end. It does not belong to our generation or to civilization. Convention 1 of The Hague does not make it compulsory for any country to arbitrate a dispute, such as that between Austria and Servia, if it does not wish to. But it also does not forbid any power in the world to fall upon the aggressor. The American people know who was the aggressor, just as Italy knew. We have had the statements of both sides. That guilty government should be taught that a monstrous war of aggression will never in the future be tolerated. Such a lesson would go very far to stop all wars."

I need dwell no longer upon this point.

Both duty and self-interest should lead America to make sure at whatever sacrifice that German militarism does not in the outrageous war which it has precipitated, triumph over the democratic ideals for which little Belgium has almost laid down her national existence, for which—under whatever nominal form of government—the Allies are valiantly fighting, and for which we as well as they should be ready to make any sacrifice of life or treasure that may be needed.

I believe—to quote "The Outlook" once more (October 21, 1914)—that—

> "As theocracy, or the attempt to make men righteous by force failed in the New England colonies; as serfdom and slavery, or the attempt to make men industrious by force, failed in Russia and the United States; as feudalism, or the attempt to make men loyal and chivalrous by force, failed in England; and as the spirit of materialistic revolution, or the attempt to make men liberal-minded and intellectually free by force, failed in France—so the doctrine of *Machtpolitik,* the attempt by Germany to impose a civilization upon humanity by force, must fail—*must be made to fail.*"

XII

What in the light of this war should be the aim of this and other civilized countries for the future?

A. To this final question I would reply in the words of Colonel Roosevelt, in a recent article on "What America Should Learn From the War": (45)

> "What is needed in international matters is to create a judge, and then to put police power back of the judge. . . .
>
> "The one permanent move for obtaining peace which has yet been suggested, with any reasonable chance of attaining its object, is by an agreement among the great powers, in which each should pledge itself not only to abide by the decisions of a common tribunal, but to back with force the decisions of that common tribunal. The great civilized nations of the world which do possess force, actual or immediately potential, should combine by solemn agreement in a great World League for the Peace of Righteousness. A court should be created—a changed and amplified Hague court would meet the requirements—composed of representatives from each nation; these representatives being sworn to act in each case as judges, pure and simple, and not in a representative capacity. The nations should agree on certain rights that should not be questioned, such as their territorial integrity, their rights to deal with their own domestic affairs and with

such matters as whom they should or should not admit to residence and citizenship within their own borders. All should guarantee each of their number in the possession of these rights. All should agree that other matters at issue between any of them, or between any of them and any one of a number of specified outside civilized nations, should be submitted to the court as above constituted. They should, furthermore, agree not only to abide, each of them, by the decision of the court, but all of them to unite with their military forces to enforce the decree of the court, as against any recalcitrant member. Under these circumstances, it would be possible to agree on a limitation of armaments that would be real and effective.

"If any nation were unwilling to go into such a general agreement with other nations, it would of necessity have to depend upon its own armed strength for its own protection. This is the only alternative. Treaties unbacked by force cannot be considered as an alternative by any sober persons of sound judgment. . . .

"Such a scheme as the one briefly outlined will not bring perfect justice any more than under municipal law we obtain perfect justice; but it will mark an immeasurable advance on anything now existing; for it will mean that at last a long stride has been taken in the effort to put the collective strength of civilized mankind behind the collective purpose of mankind to secure the peace of righteousness, the peace of justice among the nations of the earth."

SUMMARY

Reviewing what I have written and, more particularly, what I have collated, it seems to me that I have given a justifiable basis for the following opinions:

The war is a German-made war, having its source and inspiration in the writings and teachings of the Pan-Germanists; in the ambitions of an autocratic military caste, headed by a highly neurotic, unbalanced, and possibly mentally diseased overlord, with mediæval views of his relation to his country and the world, and supported by a subservient corps of "learned men," the majority of whom are paid servants of the State.

The war in the last analysis was made possible by the megalomania of a preponderating section of the German people and by the carefully nurtured and fomented desire for World Power.

To bring about this condition that People has been made to believe in the superiority—which does not exist—of German civilization to all other civilizations; in the pre-eminence—equally non-existent—of German "culture"; in the theory that Might makes Right, and that it is only in the course of Nature that weaker—and therefore presumably inferior—peoples should yield their ideals, their liberties, and their destinies into the hands of any nation that by the arbitra-

ment of War should prove itself the master of all others.

As a logical result of these views, at a time selected by reason of the undoubted preparedness of Germany, the supposed unreadiness and internal troubles of other nations, and the growing burden of the German military and naval armaments, the war was precipitated, on a relatively trivial and entirely avoidable pretext, the other great countries then concerned, England, Russia and France, having shown up to the last moment an honest and sincere desire for peace.

As an immediate step toward the attainment of her purpose Germany violated a solemn contract entered into deliberately, seventy-five years ago, and affirmed and re-affirmed by her representatives almost up to the date of its abrupt, but deliberate and undenied infraction.

As a result of this action and of the resistance properly offered, in conformity with the very treaty which Germany had contemptuously disregarded and set aside, the world has witnessed with horror the brutal despoilment, occupation, almost the annihilation, of a brave, innocent, unoffending, highly civilized and industrious country by an adversary whose only *right* in so doing rested on the *might* it was able to bring to bear.

In spite of the war's stupendous proportions, the immensity of its scope and area, and the diverse and conflicting interests involved, the principles at stake are easily recognizable.

Germany and her more or less insignificant and contemptible tools, Austria and Turkey, represent absolutism, militarism, feudalism, mediævalism, despotism, autocracy. The "Monarchical idea" is a disingenuous substitute for these terms, with which, however, it is in essence synonymous.

The Allies are fighting for democratic liberty, for representative government, for the equal rights of individuals, whether relatively insignificant persons or relatively powerless States.

So far as America is concerned, Germany and her parasites stand for everything in which we do not believe. The Allies represent—and are fighting, starving and dying for—everything that makes American liberty, happiness and independence possible.

Our technical position is one of "neutrality," but our overwhelming sympathy is with the Allies.

Our technical grievance lies in Germany's deliberate flouting of conventions of which we were, with her, a signatory; our real grievance rests on the danger to humanity, to the ideas that lie at the very foundation of our republic, to our own future security, that would attend the success of Germany in this war.

Our duties and our interests coincide.

We should at the very least strengthen the wavering, reassure the doubting, give new hope to the despairing by proclaiming to the world our absolute and unreserved belief in the right and justice of the cause of the Allies, and our determination to see to it, should the worst come to them, that they shall have our mate-

rial support to our last dollar, our last bushel of corn, our last drop of blood.

But better it would seem to many of us, and in the long run more truly merciful, if we now, on the basis of Germany's admitted and open disregard of solemn obligations *entered into with us,* determined to cast the weight of our available force—whatever it may be—into the scale. For one, I believe it would be enough to determine the result and save tens of thousands of useful lives, months of suffering to helpless women and children, and treasures of civilization to the world and to the generations that are to follow us.

Our own unpreparedness must be admitted, but with unbeaten and valiant friends there would be less risk of disaster than if we supinely await their overthrow and then have, practically alone, to battle for all that, to us, makes life worth living.

No one can *prove* that such a grim necessity will confront us, but the American who cannot see it as a possible, even a probable and not very remote sequence of the emergence of a "Triumphant Germany" from this war, is blind to the teachings of history remote and recent.

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
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